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ABSTRACT  
   
Research at the intersection of psychology and law has demonstrated that juror 
decision-making is subject to many cognitive biases, however, it fails to consider the 
influence of culturally derived cognitive biases. As jurors become increasingly 
demographically and culturally diverse it is possible—and even likely—that their 
attributions might vary because of their cultural background. I predict that cultural and 
demographic group affiliation affects attributional tendencies such that, compared to 
situationally focused individuals (those from East Asian cultures, women, those from 
lower socioeconomic status groups, and older individuals), dispositionally focused 
individuals (those from Western cultures, men, those from higher socioeconomic status 
groups, and younger individuals) are less likely to attribute some portion of causation and 
responsibility for the harm to other influences, and they are more likely to find the 
defendant liable and hold the defendant financially responsible to a greater degree. This 
dissertation has three aims: (1) to examine how culturally derived attributional tendencies 
influence jurors' assessments of causation in complex negligent tort cases where there are 
multiple causal influences (i.e., multiple tortfeasors and plaintiff negligence) (Studies 1 
and 2); (2) to study the implications of those causal determinations on liability 
determinations, damage awards, and other legal decisions (Studies 1 and 2); and (3) to 
determine whether these culturally derived attributional tendencies are malleable, 
suggesting an intervention that might be used to attenuate the influence of attributional 
tendencies in a trial setting (Study 3). This work advances psychological research on 
cultural differences in attribution by exploring attributional differences in a new domain, 
developing a new scale of individual differences in attributional tendencies, and 
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examining how multiple causal influences affects culturally derived attributional 
tendencies and downstream decision-making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario: 
It is early in the morning and Rick is speeding on a mostly empty two-lane road. 
The road is wet, and a dense fog has settled upon it. Up the road, a city bus has 
run out of gas and the bus driver has attempted to pull over to the shoulder. The 
bus, however, is still slightly blocking the roadway. Rick’s car hits the bus. 
Now imagine you were asked to determine the extent to which Rick’s driving, the road 
and weather conditions, and the bus slightly blocking the roadway were causal influences 
of the car accident. How would you apportion responsibility between each of these three 
influences? Do you believe Rick should be held legally responsible for the accident? If 
so, to what extent should Rick be held financially responsible for the accident? 
 This scenario and these questions are a simplified version of what a juror might 
grapple with in some negligent accident cases. In negligent tort cases, there are four 
elements necessary to support an action: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages 
(Restatement (Third) of Torts, 2010). A plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a 
duty to the plaintiff; breached that duty by acting in an inappropriate way; and caused 
harm to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of duty. It is the responsibility of the jury to 
decide whether the defendant breached his or her duty and consequently caused the harm 
to the plaintiff. In other words, the jury decides whether the defendant should be held 
liable for the harm caused and, if so, the appropriate amount of damages the defendant 
should have to pay to the victim. 
 In some negligent tort cases, the causal chain is straight forward. If a driver rear-
ends another car because she took her eyes off the road to look at her cellphone, then that 
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driver’s actions clearly caused the accident. But, in other negligent tort cases, the causal 
chain is not so straight forward, as is evident in the first scenario presented. In that 
scenario, there are three contributing causal influences: Rick’s driving (specifically his 
speeding), the road and weather conditions, and the bus slightly blocking the roadway. In 
a variety of negligent tort cases there are situations in which multiple actors all contribute 
to the harm. For example, one might imagine a medical malpractice case involving a 
botched surgery where a medical device fails. In this case the surgeons, nurses, hospital, 
and medical device manufacture may all cause and contribute to the harm. In complex 
negligent tort cases where there are multiple causal influences and multiple potential 
tortfeasors, how do jurors assess complex issues of causation and what are the 
implications for liability, damage award assessments, and other downstream decisions? 
When examining juror judgment and decision-making it is important to consider 
how jurors perceive and are influenced by the facts presented in cases like these. 
Additionally, it is also important to consider whether all jurors are influenced by the 
present facts in the same way.  As jurors become increasingly demographically and 
culturally diverse it is possible—and even likely—that their perceptions of the case might 
vary systematically, and in predictable ways, because of their own cultural background.  
As Levinson and Peng (2004) suggest, cultural differences might influence juror 
judgment and decision-making in tort law.  
Findings within social and cultural psychology suggest there are systematic 
differences in individuals’ cognitive tendencies as a result of cultural influences that 
produce specific cognitive biases. As such, cultural differences in cognition might have a 
large impact on juror judgment and decision-making, especially considering that jurors 
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are intended to represent a cross-section of the American population. According to the 
U.S. Census, in about three decades no single ethnic group will constitute a majority of 
the country (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). The proportion of the population that is 
comprised of traditionally minority ethnic groups is projected to continue to grow. 
African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinos will continue to account for an even 
larger percent of the American population. Thus, juries are becoming increasingly 
comprised of demographically diverse individuals.  
Further, empirical evidence suggests jurors on the same case who saw the same 
evidence do not always reach the same conclusions. For example, jurors rarely agree 
when they take their first vote (Kalven & Zeisel, 1971). These results occur despite the 
fact that jurors are presented with the same evidence, suggesting that these differences 
must stem from pre-existing differences between jurors rather than the influence of the 
evidence (Diamond, 1990). Although some variability in decision-making might stem 
from personal beliefs and individual differences, cultural and demographic differences 
that emerge in a diverse jury may also account for some of the variability in decision-
making. Therefore, empirical research examining the influence of cultural cognitive 
tendencies would help judges, lawyers, policy makers, and scholars better understand the 
ways in which jurors are differentially influenced by their cultural cognitive tendencies. 
Yet research on cultural differences in juror decision-making is still largely unexplored. 
Relevant to this project, cultural research indicates that certain cultural groups 
(such as Asian Americans and those who have low socioeconomic status) are less likely 
to attribute behavior to an actor’s personal disposition and are more likely to attribute that 
behavior to situational influences compared to others (such as European Americans and 
  4 
those who have higher socioeconomic status) (e.g., Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; 
Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994; Nisbett, 2003). This 
could influence how jurors perceive issues related to social causality—defined as the 
social process or mechanisms that influence an event—in negligent tort cases.  
This dissertation seeks to examine how culturally derived attributional tendencies 
influence jurors’ assessments of causation, liability, and other legal determinations in 
complex negligent tort cases where there are multiple causal influences (i.e., multiple 
tortfeasors and plaintiff negligence) (see Table 1 for the variables of interest). I begin by 
providing the relevant legal background for negligent tort cases. Then, I review the 
literature on social attributions and observed cultural differences in attributional 
tendencies. Finally, I discuss three studies that examine the influence of culturally 
derived attributional tendencies on jurors’ assessments of causation, liability, and other 
legal determinations in complex negligent tort cases. 
Negligent Torts 
Standard Liability Assessments 
In negligent tort cases, there are four elements necessary to establish a cause of 
action: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. A legal duty can arise in several 
ways including through statutes that create a duty of care, special relationships, contracts, 
and from a general duty of care (Franklin, Rabin, & Green, 2006).  
In a negligent tort case, a breach of duty occurs when the defendant acts 
negligently. In general, negligence is determined according to the reasonable person 
standard. This standard is used to determine when an ordinary individual’s behavior has 
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crossed the threshold into the domain of unacceptable risky behavior. According to the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts (2010): 
A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all 
the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the 
person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the 
person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that 
may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm. 
Essentially, it is up to the jury to decide whether the defendant’s actions in the situation 
were reasonable—in which case there is no liability—or unreasonable. An individual is 
deemed negligent if he or she acts in a way that departs from the conduct expected of a 
“reasonably prudent person” under similar circumstances. According to the law, the 
“reasonably prudent person” is the community’s judgment—which in practice means the 
jury’s judgment—of how the typical person should behave in situations that might pose a 
threat to another (Epstein, 1999). In a negligent tort case the jury is responsible for 
deciding the facts of the case and making an evaluation about the appropriateness of the 
defendant’s actions using the reasonableness standard (Kelley & Wendt, 2001).  
 The third element of a tort case is factual causation (Franklin, Rabin, & Green, 
2006). The plaintiff must show that there is a causal connection between the defendant’s 
actions and the harm to the plaintiff (Epstein, 1999). According to the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts (2010), “Tortious conduct must be a factual cause of harm for liability to 
be imposed. Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred 
absent the conduct.” This is known as “but-for” causation. Without this connection the 
defendant will not be held legally responsible, no matter how egregious the intent or 
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actions of the defendant. Tort law does not hold a defendant liable for attempted harm or 
near misses (Epstein, 1999).  
Factual cause, or but-for cause, seeks to tie the defendant’s conduct to the 
plaintiff’s harm in a physical or scientific way. The goal is to factually establish that if 
“X” had not occurred then “Y” would not have occurred (Epstein, 1999). In other words, 
the plaintiff must establish that through a sequence of events the defendant’s actions in 
some way caused the harm to the plaintiff. For example, imagine the plaintiff is claiming 
that the defendant threw a baseball that struck the plaintiff in the head. The plaintiff must 
show that the ball thrown by the defendant actually hit her head and that it was not some 
other object outside of the defendant’s control. Assuming that the ball thrown by the 
defendant did hit the plaintiff’s head, then the plaintiff must also show that the impact 
caused her injury, a concussion. If the ball was thrown very lightly then it is unlikely that 
it would cause the harm. In that case, maybe the concussion was actually the result of the 
plaintiff tripping and hitting her head the day before. Any number of factors could make 
the plaintiff’s task of proving a causal connect more difficult including intervening 
influences, preexisting conditions, the increased lapse of time between the defendant’s 
behavior and the harm, and so on.  
Factual cause should not be confused with the legal issue of proximate cause, 
better referred to as the scope of liability (Restatement (Third) of Torts, 2010). Per the 
Restatement, “An actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result from the risk that 
made the actor’s conduct tortious.” Essentially, proximate cause asks whether there is a 
close enough nexus between what the defendant has negligently done and the harm to the 
plaintiff to warrant liability (Franklin, Rabin, & Green, 2006). Proximate cause exists to 
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prevent holding the defendant responsible in cases where the causal connection is deemed 
too attenuated to merit legal liability. According to the Restatement, proximate cause 
“functions as a limitation on liability in a select group of cases, operating more like an 
affirmative defense, although formally it is not one.” 
For example, assume a driver is speeding and hits a rock which then flies in the 
air ten feet away from a cat sunning itself on a nearby roof. The startled cat jumps and 
kicks a ball that is on the roof, left there from a game some neighborhood kids had been 
playing the week before. The ball rolls off the roof and crashes into a flower pot on its 
way down. That knocks the flower pot off its stand where it falls on the head of a hapless 
pedestrian who happened to be walking by. The pedestrian suffers a concussion as well 
as cuts from the flower pot shards that injure his eye. In this case, the driver’s speeding is 
the “but-for” cause of the pedestrian’s injuries. Had he been driving more slowly, the 
trajectory of the rock would have been different and it would not have startled the cat.  
But, the driver has a pretty good claim that his speeding is not the “proximate cause” of 
the injuries.  It is likely that the causal connection is too attenuated to merit legal liability. 
A startled cat kicking a ball, which upsets a flower pot, which falls on the head of 
pedestrian who happened by at the right moment is probably not the type of harm the 
negligent tort system seeks to compensate.    
The final element in a negligent tort is that the plaintiff must show that he or she 
was in some way harmed (Franklin, Rabin, & Greene, 2006). This can take many forms 
including: physical injury, property damage, loss of income, and emotional harm. If the 
plaintiff can show that the defendant owed a duty, breached that duty, and that the breach 
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of duty caused harm to the plaintiff then the defendant should be held liable and a 
monetary damage award can be assessed against the defendant. 
Damage Awards 
 In addition to assessing liability, jurors are also asked to award damages in 
negligent tort cases. Damage awards are largely intended to provide a form of redress for 
the defendant’s actions (Epstein, 1999). Damages generally fall under two categories: 
compensatory damages and punitive damages (Franklin, Rabin, & Green, 2006). 
Compensatory damages are intended to compensate the plaintiff for the quantifiable 
monetary losses he or she suffered in the past or will suffer in the future because of the 
defendant’s actions. This can include “special damages” for direct losses and economic 
losses. This category includes losses associated with medical bills, property damages, lost 
earnings, and other measurable losses. In general, damages in this category are easily 
quantifiable. Compensatory damages are also comprised of general damages, which 
include compensation for non-economic damages such as pain and suffering. Damages in 
this category are more subjective and it is often left to the jury to figure out how to value 
the pain and suffering of a plaintiff.  
The second category of damages is punitive damages. Punitive damages can be 
awarded in addition to compensatory damages when a defendant’s conduct is willful, 
wanton, malicious, vindictive, or oppressive (Franklin et al., 2006). Thus, to award 
punitive damages, it is necessary to prove more than mere negligence. For example, 
punitive damages may be awarded in cases where the defendant was shown to be 
reckless. Punitive damages are justified in cases where compensatory damages are 
inadequate for deterring some actors from flouting the law when dealing with the person 
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and property of others (Epstein, 1999). Thus, in these types of cases, punitive damages 
are intended to punish the wrongdoer and to act as a deterrent. It is important to note that 
punitive damages are rarely awarded although the frequency with which they are awarded 
has been increasing in recent history (Epstein, 1999). If a defendant’s conduct is deemed 
worthy of punitive damages, then it is often a subjective amount left up to the discretion 
of the jury. However, many states have responded to the increasing use of punitive 
damages by placing caps on the maximum possible award for punitive damages 
(Robbennolt & Studebaker, 1999). 
Dividing Liability between Multiple Actors 
 In a negligent tort case, it is possible for there to be more than one actor that 
causes the harm to the plaintiff. Any number of scenarios are possible in which multiple 
tortfeasors, and even the plaintiff, may contribute to the harm to the plaintiff. Take for 
example the scenario first described involving a car accident between Rick and a bus. In 
that case, both Rick and the bus driver were causal factors in the accident. Rick was 
speeding and the bus driver failed to completely pull over, so the bus was still blocking 
the roadway. Similarly, in a medical malpractice context involving a botched surgery 
where a medical device fails, the actions of the surgeons, nurses, hospital, and medical 
device manufacturer may all causally contribute to the resulting harm to the patient.  
The negligent tort law system in America contains a number of different policies 
and standards for finding multiple actors liable for the same harm. These policies and 
standards have developed over time and vary by jurisdiction. Historically, most states 
applied the principle of contributory negligence. Under this doctrine, a plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover any damages when the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the 
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negligence of both the defendant and the plaintiff (Best, 2007). Thus, if the plaintiff was 
determined to have caused his or her own injury to even the slightest degree, the plaintiff 
could not recover any damages from the defendant. Because of the all-or-nothing nature 
of contributory negligence, the legal community at the time was generally of the belief 
that juries would ignore the contributory negligence instructions and render verdicts for 
the plaintiff even if there was substantial evidence supporting a finding that the plaintiff 
was also negligent. Thus, from 1969 to 1984, 37 states in an avalanche of tort reform 
abolished contributory negligence in favor of some form of comparative negligence. 
Courts and legislatures involved in the adoption of comparative negligence reform 
measures, cited factors such as fairness and justice as the impetus for shifting away from 
contributory negligence. 
Comparative negligence is a partial legal defense asserted by the defendant in 
which part of the responsibility for the harm is attributed to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff 
can still recover some damages from the defendant (Best, 2007). Pure comparative 
negligence requires that each responsible party pay the direct proportion of damages that 
resulted from their negligent behavior. When the plaintiff is found to have contributed to 
his or her negligently-caused injury, this doctrine has the effect of reducing the amount of 
damages that a plaintiff can recover in a negligent tort case. Thus, it is possible that a jury 
could find the plaintiff contributed to their own harm and hold the defendant financially 
responsible for only a portion of the harm. For example, if the bus driver in our initial 
scenario sued Rick for the damages he sustained in the accident, under a comparative 
negligence doctrine he may only recover a portion of his damages if the jury finds he was 
also negligent for blocking roadway. 
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Although contributory and comparative negligence involve issues of liability, 
there are other doctrines that deal specifically with collecting damages from multiple 
tortfeasors once liability has been established. One such doctrine is joint and several 
liability (Franklin, Rabin, & Green, 2006). According to this doctrine, every tortfeasor 
who had a part in causing the harm to the plaintiff is considered responsible for the full 
cost of the harm, regardless of how small a part he or she might have played. As the 
United States Supreme Court described the doctrine in 1933, “[t]he rule is settled by 
innumerable authorities that if injury be caused by the concurring negligence of the 
defendant and a third person, the defendant is liable to the same extent as though it had 
been caused by his negligence alone” (Miller v. Union Pacific R. Co., 1933, p. 236). 
Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, a plaintiff could sue as few as one of the 
tortfeasors and collect all of his or her damages from that tortfeasor. However, unless the 
other tortfeasors are judgment proof, the paying-tortfeasor has a claim of contribution 
against the other tortfeasors for their portion of the damages. In this situation it is the 
responsibility of the paying-tortfeasors, rather than the plaintiff, to collect from the other 
tortfeasors. If, however, the other tortfeasors are judgment proof then the paying-
tortfeasors are responsible for the full damages amount. This doctrine strongly favors 
plaintiffs in that it allows the plaintiff to go after the defendant with “deep pockets” to 
collect all of his or her damages.  
As a consequence of legislative tort reform in the 1980s and early 1990s some 
jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine of several liability (Peck, 2005). Under this 
system, if multiple defendants are sued then the plaintiff can only collect a proportion of 
the damages from each defendant depending on their allocated proportion of 
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responsibility (Epstein, 1999). Several liability resembles comparative negligence in the 
sense that each defendant is financially responsible for only the proportion of harm that 
his or her negligent actions caused. Using our earlier example involving a botched 
surgery, the plaintiff can only collect part of the damage award from each defendant in 
proportion to their responsibility. If one surgeon is found 50% at fault, then the plaintiff 
can only recover 50% of the monetary damage amount from that surgeon. One 
consequence of this doctrine is if a plaintiff fails to name all responsible parties as 
defendants in the lawsuit, then the plaintiff may be unable to recover financial 
compensation for all of his or her damages.  
The Fundamental Attribution Error and Correspondence Bias 
 
 For nearly as long as social psychology has been a discipline, researchers have 
been interested in how ordinary people as “naïve psychologists” interpret their own 
behavior and the actions of others (Ross, 1977). This work has largely focused on two 
related tasks associated with attribution theory. The first is known as the causal 
judgment. For this task the observer identifies the causal agent, or agents, to which an 
action or outcome can most reasonably be attributed. The second task is the social 
inference. In this task the observer forms inferences about the attributes of the causal 
agents of an action or outcome and must decide whether it is the disposition of the actor 
or the properties of the situation which the actor primarily responded to. Despite there 
being numerous theories of attribution that vary in their details (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), 
all of the theories recognize a distinction between the internal, or dispositional, nature of 
the actor (e.g., abilities, traits, or motives) and the external, or situational, influences 
(e.g., task difficulties, incentives, or peer pressures). 
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 Early researchers studied social attributions expecting that if an action or outcome 
occurs in the presence of a “strong, facilitative force” then an observer should not overly 
attribute the cause of the behavior to an internal characteristic of the individual. Instead, 
the observer should acknowledge the external influences and not see the actor as 
predisposed to performing that behavior (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). However, research 
originally intended to illustrate this effect instead showed that ordinary individuals in 
their capacity as “naïve psychologists” tend to attribute more causal influence to internal 
factors and infer attributes about an individual despite the situational influences on his or 
her behavior. These effects were termed the fundamental attribution error—defined as 
“the tendency for attributors to underestimate the impact of situational factors and to 
overestimate the role of dispositional factors in controlling behavior” (Ross, 1977, p. 
183)—and the correspondence bias—defined as the tendency for social perceivers to 
infer an internal characteristic of an actor that corresponds to his or her behavior even 
when the behavior is socially constrained (Jones & Harris, 1967).  
 The classic experiment by Jones and Harris (1967) demonstrated the 
correspondence bias using the attitude attribution paradigm. In this study, participants 
were shown essays that either supported or opposed Cuba’s president, Fidel Castro. 
These participants were either told that the essay writer was allowed to choose which side 
of the issue he would write about or that the essay writer was instructed by his debate 
coach to defend a specific side of the issue. In the free choice condition, participants 
inferred strong pro- and anti-Castro attitudes for the essay writing. Given that the 
participants were lead to believe that the essay writers were allowed to choose their 
position, it is logical that an observer would assume that their essays were aligned with 
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their attitudes. However, when the participants were told that the essay writer was 
instructed to defend a specific side of the issue, participants still inferred strong pro- and 
anti-Castro attitudes. These findings indicate that participants failed to appropriately 
consider information about the situational constraints on the essay writers and instead 
committed the correspondence bias. 
 Bierbrauer (1973) demonstrated the fundamental attribution error by examining 
participants’ impressions of the influences operating in the classic Milgram (1963) 
situation. Participants viewed a realistic Milgram study reenactment (using verbatim 
dialog) of one Teacher’s obedience to the point of delivering the maximum shock to a 
victim (who was really a confederate that was not actually being shocked). There were 
multiple conditions in which the participants actually played the role of the Teacher in the 
reenactment or they merely observed the reenactment. Regardless of the conditions, 
participants consistently underestimated the degree to which the Teacher in the 
reenactment would yield to the situational forces that compelled obedience. Instead, 
participants assumed that the obedience reflected a dispositional characteristic of the 
participant in the reenactment, thus demonstrating the fundamental attribution error. 
 These studies along with numerous additional studies examining the fundamental 
attribution error and correspondence bias indicate that social perceivers tend to discount 
situational information when making attributions. This was one of the most robust 
findings in cognitive social psychology, and there was a point in the history of the field 
where many researchers would have argued that this was a universal component of social 
cognition (e.g., Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977). Yet, all of these studies focused almost 
exclusively on North American samples. Interestingly, there is now evidence that 
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indicates that the fundamental attribution error and correspondence bias, although highly 
prevalent in some American samples, may actually be attenuated or even absent in other 
cultural and demographic groups. In fact, cultural studies have shown that certain cultural 
groups, such as Asians, are less likely to attribute behavior to an actor’s disposition and 
are more likely to attribute that behavior to situational influences compared to other 
cultural groups, such as Westerners (e.g., Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Miller, 
1984; Morris & Peng, 1994; Nisbett, 2003).  
The Influence of Culture on Social Attributions 
Most social and cultural psychologists would agree that people differ in the ways 
they perceive and interpret information which consequently affects their judgment and 
decision-making (Nisbett, 2003). Culture is one factor that can systematically influence 
cognitive tendencies. Consequently, cultures may differ in how they perceive and 
interpret social information, and it is reasonable to expect that culture may lead to 
systematic differences in attributional tendencies. Thus it is important to consider how 
cultural psychologists who study this area conceptualize “culture.” The next section with 
briefly discuss what is meant by “culture” for the purposes of this dissertation. Then, the 
following section will describe observed cultural differences in attributional tendencies. 
Defining “Culture” 
Many researchers in the fields of social and cultural psychology have struggled 
with finding an adequate definition of culture.  For this project it is useful to 
conceptualize culture as a “shared patterns of behaviors and interactions, cognitive 
constructs, and affective understanding that are learned through a process of socialization 
(CARLA, 2014).” This definition of culture focuses on the way in which culture 
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influences the psychological characteristics and processes of the individuals within that 
culture, rather than focusing on the observable differences between cultures such as 
traditions and norms. Until the start of the 21st century, mainstream psychologists 
assumed that cognitive processes were universal for all normally functioning adults 
(Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). But, it is now understood that there are 
systematic differences in how people perceive, interpret, and understand the world and 
that these patterns are learned from specific social environments. In some sense, culture 
can be conceptualized as the lens through which an individual sees, perceives, and 
interprets the world (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000). We each walk 
around with culturally determined lenses that affect how we perceive and interpret 
information including the actions of others. As the empirical research indicates, these 
effects can be quite profound. 
Although culture is often thought of as differences based on nationality—such as 
American or Chinese culture—in actuality there are many different types of social groups 
that could be considered distinct cultures (Markus & Connor, 2013). People with shared 
experiences will display similar patterns of thinking and behaving. In this sense different 
ethnic groups, people from different socioeconomic backgrounds, and even people from 
different regions within the United States could be thought of as being from distinct 
cultures (Markus & Connor, 2013). To the extent each of these groups faces unique 
challenges and ecological influences they will each develop their own patterns of 
thoughts and behaviors. Markus and Connor (2013) identify a number of cultural 
divisions for which there are recognized cultural differences between the groups, 
including: gender cultures, cultures of race and ethnicity, socioeconomic cultures, U.S. 
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regional cultures, workplace cultures, and cultures of the global north and south. As they 
acknowledge, however, this is not an exhaustive list of cultural divisions. 
Cross-Cultural and Within-Nation Ethnic Differences in Attributional Tendencies 
 As previously mentioned, there is now evidence indicating that although the 
fundamental attribution error and correspondence bias may be highly prevalent in some 
Americans, they may actually be attenuated or even absent in other cultures (e.g., Choi, 
Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). These differences could have profound implications for 
how different cultural groups attend to and interpret their social environment. As such, a 
body of literature exists which examines how cultural differences in attributional 
tendencies affect individual judgment and decision-making. This section will review the 
literature examining cultural differences in social attribution.  The cultural differences 
reviewed include: (1) describing causality in physical events; (2) attributions of attitudes; 
(3) describing people and their behaviors; (4) making predictions about future behavior; 
(5) attributing causal influences to “fate”; (6) the processing of social information; and 
(7) conceptions of agency. Although the majority of this literature focuses on differences 
between ethnic groups, a final subsection will also review observed attributional 
differences in other cultural and demographic groups including groups based on 
socioeconomic status, frontier environments, age, and gender.  
Describing the causality of physical events. In establishing cultural difference in 
attributional tendencies, one initial question is whether there are cultural differences in 
attributing causation in physical events in addition to social events. To the extent 
individuals from different cultures show the same attributional tendencies for physical 
events, this would suggest that these cultures share a similar understanding of the 
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physical world and that the attributional differences otherwise observed are strictly 
differences in social cognition. Morris and Peng (1994) had American and Chinese 
participants watch cartoon displays of a physical event—an object moving across a 
soccer field—or a social event—a group of fish swimming in a lake. They found there 
were no cultural differences in the causal attributions for the physical event but there 
were for the social event. This suggests that although American and Chinese participants 
display attributional differences for social events, this is not because of underlying 
differences in how each culture understands causal agents within the physical world. 
Instead, it is a difference unique to social perception. 
Attributions of attitudes. As exemplified by the Jones & Harris (1967) study 
using pro- and anti-Castro essays, American participants tend to infer an internal 
characteristic of an actor that corresponds to his or her behavior even when the behavior 
is socially constrained. However, the evidence suggests that some cultural groups, such 
as Koreans, are less subject to the correspondence bias especially if situational constraints 
are made salient (Choi & Nisbett, 1998). Using an attitude attribution paradigm similar to 
Jones & Harris (1967), researchers asked Korean and American participants to infer the 
true attitudes of an essay writer who wrote an essay either supporting or opposing capital 
punishment. The results indicated that American participants displayed more 
correspondence bias compared to the Korean participants. In the second study, Choi and 
Nisbett increased the salience of the situational constraints by having the participants 
write an essay like the essay writer they are assessing. Again they found that American 
participants showed just as much correspondence bias regardless of the salience of the 
situation. However, they found that the correspondence bias was once again lower for the 
  19 
Korean participants, especially if they were in the condition in which the situational 
constraints were made salient. These findings suggest that the correspondence bias—once 
thought to be universal—occurs to a lesser extent in some cultures especially when 
situational influences are made salient.  
Describing other people and their behaviors. Early work looking at cultural 
differences in attribution focused on how different cultural groups described other 
individuals and their behavior. For example, one study asked American and Hindu Indian 
participants to explain the behavior of acquaintances (Miller, 1984).  American 
participants explained the behaviors of others in terms of traits (e.g., competitiveness) 
whereas Hindu Indians explained the behavior in terms of social roles and other context-
dependent factors. The results also indicated that the cross-cultural difference was even 
more pronounced for deviant behaviors than for prosocial behaviors. In addition, research 
suggests that the observed results between Hindu and Americans are the result of 
acculturation, as the marked differences in social attributions are less apparent in young 
children (Miller, 1984; Miller, 1986). 
 A similar study asked Americans and Saudis to make attributions about eight 
different situations by specifying a percentage (out of 100%) of the responsibility that 
they would assign to internal causes (e.g., ability, effort, personality characteristic) and 
external causes (e.g., task difficulty, luck, external pressures) (Al-Zahrani & Kaplowitz, 
1993). As predicted, the results indicated that Saudis, who are more collectivistic than 
Americans, were less likely to make internal attributions than the American participants. 
Thus, Saudis were less likely to commit the fundamental attribution error than 
Americans.  
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 Although much of the research exploring cultural differences in attributional 
tendencies is experimental, there has been some work examining differences that emerge 
in the “real world” using naturalistic observation. Lee, Hallahan, and Herzog (1996) 
compared newspaper articles from the United States and Hong Kong examining the 
sports articles and editorials from each country. Overall, a significant difference between 
the cultures emerged such that attributions made in the United States newspapers were 
more dispositional than those made in the Hong Kong newspapers. This effect was 
especially strong for the sports articles compared to the editorials. The authors believe 
this occurred because the editorial writers expended more cognitive effort which reduced 
the dispositional bias, compared to the sports writers whose articles took less cognitive 
effort to write. 
 Additional work by cultural psychologists has examined cultural differences in 
attributing responsibility for criminal behavior. Morris and Peng (1994) examined 
cultural differences in attribution by examining individuals’ attributions for mass 
murders. They started by examining the language used in a top English-language United 
States newspaper (The New York Times) and top Chinese-language United States 
newspaper (World Journal) that reported on similar mass murder incidents. They found 
that the English-language newspaper used more personal disposition attributions and 
explanations of the crime compared to the Chinese-language newspaper which used more 
situational attribution and explanations. For example, the English-language newspaper 
focused on the perpetrator’s poor character, bad temper, and mental problems whereas 
the Chinese-language newspaper focused on interpersonal issues instigating the attack 
and societal influences. A second study asked American and Chinese participants—all of 
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whom were graduate students in the United States—to evaluate the same events reported 
in the newspapers. Again they found that situational factors were given greater weight by 
the Chinese participants compared to the Americans.  
Making predictions about future behaviors. In addition to cultural differences 
in describing other people and their behaviors as a result of differences in attributional 
tendencies, there have also been documented cultural differences in perceivers’ 
predictions about the future behaviors of others. Although much of the previous cross-
cultural work on social inferences has focused on explanations of behaviors and attitudes, 
Norenzayan, Choi, and Nisbett (2002) focused on cross-cultural predictions of behavior. 
This work indicated that when there was only minimal situational information present, 
both Koreans and Americans made strong predictions about future behavior regardless of 
whether one of the targets had less trait consistency than the other. However, when 
situational information was provided and made salient, Koreans were more likely than 
Americans to apply situational information when predicting the behavior of the target 
individual. These findings suggest that some cultures take situational factors into account 
more than others when making predictions about future behavior. 
Attributing causal influences to “fate.” Interestingly, cultural differences in the 
use of situational attributions have been linked to the tendency to use fate attributions. 
According to Norenzayan and Lee (2010), fate attributions are characterized by the 
outcome being perceived as predetermined and fixed in advance. Thus, cultures that are 
more situationally focused are more likely to have causal complexity. Causal complexity 
is the perception that any outcome can be produced by multiple causes and that any 
single cause can lead to multiple outcomes. Thus, to cultural groups that are more 
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situationally focused, an outcome feels more inevitable and thus easier to attribute to fate. 
In a series of studies, Norenzayan and Lee found that East Asian Canadians tend to 
attribute events to fate more often than European Canadians, and they also found that the 
relationship was mediated by causal complexity. In other words, East Asians Canadians 
tended to show increased causal complexity which is what led them to attribute events to 
fate more than European Canadians. In their final study, they were even able to 
experimentally manipulate causal complexity in European Canadians so that participants 
who received the causal complexity prime were more likely to attribute events to fate 
than those in the control condition. 
Differences in processing social information. The findings previously discussed 
all indicate that there are consistent differences between cultural groups in their 
attributional tendencies. Additional research has shown that attributional tendencies may 
emerge because of differences in how cultures process social information. Choi, Dalal, 
Kim-Prieto, and Park (2003) examined whether cultures differed in the amount of 
information they considered before making a final attribution. Further, they examined 
whether this is what leads some cultures to make more situationally focused attributions. 
They theorized that the causal theories of East Asians are more complex (than those of 
Americans), therefore East Asians will process more information than Americans before 
making their final attributions. In their first study Choi and colleagues provided 
American, Asian American, and Korean participants with a short description of a 
graduate student killing his or her advisor and a list containing several items of 
information that might be relevant in explaining the actor’s behavior. These items 
consisted of 97 pieces of information about the graduate student, the professor, both the 
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professor and the graduate student, or the context in which the incident occurred. 
Participants were then asked to either exclude or include items that they thought were 
relevant. Overall, Koreans identified more items as relevant than either Americans or 
Asian Americans, and Koreans had an even harder time discarding pieces of information 
than Americans or Asian Americans regardless of whether the information was about 
internal or external factors. Interestingly, the results of the study indicated that there were 
no significant differences between Americans and Asian Americans. A follow-up study 
replicated these results using a prosocial scenario in which an individual helped a car 
accident victim.  
Finally, Choi and colleagues connected these studies to cultural differences in 
attribution by replicating their first study while also measuring social attributions. They 
found that Koreans made weaker internal attributions than Americans and this effect was 
mediated by the amount of information processed by the participants. Overall, Koreans 
processed more information and made weaker internal attributions. Interestingly, they 
also measured external attributions which were only marginally stronger for Koreans than 
for Americans. When testing the mediation model, they found that Koreans processed 
more information, but the amount of information did not affect the degree of internal 
attributions. These findings suggest that the cultural differences in how much information 
people process affects their tendency to make internal attributions. 
In line with the previous studies, additional work suggests that Koreans are less 
likely to commit the correspondence bias if salient situational information is present 
(Choi & Nisbett, 1998). Using the attitude attribution paradigm similar to Jones and 
Harris (1967), Choi and Nisbett found that the correspondence bias was lower for the 
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Korean participants, especially if they were in the condition in which the situational 
constraints were made salient by having the participant write an essay with a forced 
viewpoint like the target was asked to do. These findings suggest that for Koreans the 
tendency towards committing the correspondence bias is influenced by the extent to 
which situational information is present and made salient. Again, this research highlights 
the importance of the presence of situational information in how some cultures process 
information about make causal attributions.   
Miyamoto and Kitayama (2002) also explored the influence of information on 
cultural differences in attributions using the attitude attribution paradigm by manipulating 
the attitude diagnosticity of the essay. They argued that it is reasonable for a perceiver to 
see an essay as more diagnostic of the attitude of the author if it is long, persuasive, and 
well composed. Arguably these types of essays would appear to be written 
enthusiastically. Thus Miyamoto and Kitayama hypothesized that the cross-cultural 
differences in the correspondence bias would be moderated by the attitude diagnosticity 
of socially constrained behavior. Using the standard attitude attribution paradigm and 
manipulating the quality of the essay, they found support for their hypothesis. Americans, 
regardless of the quality of the essay, showed a very strong correspondence bias. In 
contrast, Japanese participants showed an equally strong correspondence bias as 
Americans when the essays were well written, but when the essays were poorly written 
and unpersuasive there was no correspondence bias. A second study indicated that these 
effects were mediated by situational thoughts that occurred during attitudinal judgments. 
Again, these studies indicate the importance of the presence of situational information 
  25 
processing for causal attributions in some cultures, in this case specifically Japanese 
culture.  
Differences in conceptions of agency. A corollary of culturally derived 
differences in attributional tendencies are culturally derived differences in implicit 
theories of agency. According to Morris, Menon, and Ames (2001), Americans primarily 
conceptualize agency as a property of individual persons. In contrast, East Asians 
conceptualize agency in terms of collectives. Menon, Morris, Chiu, and Hong (1999) 
compared newspaper articles in Japan and the United States explaining “rogue trader” 
scandals involving both individual and organization actors. They found that the American 
newspaper referred to more properties of the individual than the organization, whereas 
the Japanese newspaper referred to more organizational properties than individual 
properties. Further, in a follow-up study, Menon and colleagues examined American and 
Chinese perceptions of a project that could have failed either because an individual acted 
as a “free rider” or because the group failed to integrate the member. They found that 
American students were more likely to endorse individual dispositions as the cause of the 
failure, whereas Chinese students were more likely to endorse group dispositions. 
Findings from within-nation cultural groups. Although there are many 
different types of social groups that have culture (Markus & Connor, 2013), much of the 
research examining cultural differences in attributional tendencies has focused on ethnic 
or national differences primarily between Asians and Westerners. However, some 
research has compared attributional tendencies in other types of cultural groups.  
Socioeconomic status. Grossmann and Varnum (2011) examined the influence of 
socioeconomic status in addition to nationality differences between Americans and 
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Russians. Participants were asked to read vignettes which described a protagonist who 
performed either a desirable or undesirable action, and then they rated the extent to which 
they thought internal and external factors influenced the protagonist’s actions. As 
predicted, they found that overall Russians made less dispositional attributions than 
Americans. However, they also found that above and beyond the effect of nationality, 
lower social class participants made less dispositional and more situational attributions 
than those from higher social class. These findings indicate that groups with different 
socioeconomic status also show cultural differences in attributional tendencies. 
 Frontier culture. Likewise, there is also evidence suggesting that there are 
cultural differences in attributional tendencies in frontier cultures compared to non-
frontier cultures (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006). According to 
the voluntary settlement theory posited by Kitayama and colleagues, frontiers foster a 
culture of independence. Frontier life is often harsh, entails a great deal of risk, and 
requires a major investment and personal sacrifice from the individual. Consequently, the 
types of people who choose to voluntarily settle a frontier tend to have goal-oriented 
characteristics that quickly evolve into a culturally shared social inference that behavior 
is internally motivated and controlled. Thus, Kitayama and colleagues hypothesized that 
frontier cultures, like the United States, should make more dispositional attributions.  
To test this theory, Kitayama and colleagues compared the attributions of 
individuals from the United States, Japan, and Hokkaido. Until the mid-19th century, the 
island of Hokkaido (an island north of Japan) was largely wild and inhabited only by 
indigenous people. However, in the mid-19th century the Japanese government recruited 
individuals to begin settling Hokkaido, making it a naturally occurring test case for the 
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frontier cultures hypothesis. The study indicated that, similar to Americans, Hokkaido-
born participants emphasized dispositional factors more than external factors when rating 
the desirable and undesirable actions of individuals from six vignettes. However, the 
mainland Japanese participants did not show this effect. Thus, in this study the 
participants from the Hokkaido frontier culture were more likely to commit the 
fundamental attribution error than their closely related mainland Japanese counterparts, 
supporting the theory that frontier culture affects attributional tendencies.  
 Age. There has also been research indicating differences in attributional 
tendencies based on age, however the findings have been mixed. Some research suggests 
that within the United States older adults show a stronger dispositional bias than younger 
adults (Blanchard-Fields, Chen, Horhota, & Wang, 2007). For example, older adults are 
more likely to make dispositional attributions for the cause of negative events more so 
than younger adults (Blanchard-Fields & Beatty, 2005). There is also evidence using the 
attitude attribution paradigm indicating that older Americans show the correspondence 
bias more so than young adults (Blanchard-Fields & Horhota, 2005; Follett & Hess, 
2002), however the age effect was eliminated when the situational constraints reflected a 
plausible motive for the essay writer’s behavior (Blanchard-Fields & Horhota, 2005). 
One explanation for this effect is that as people age they have fewer cognitive 
resources to devote to the processing of social information, therefore their attributions 
become more dispositional. However, Blanchard-Fields and colleagues (2007) theorized 
that the effect is actually the result of becoming more entrenched within one’s culture. 
Therefore, they predicted that, although Americans show a stronger correspondence bias 
as they age, Chinese adults should show more situational bias than their younger 
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counterparts. Using the attitude attribution paradigm, they tested this hypothesis using 
Chinese and American participants. They found that older Americans provided more 
dispositional ratings than their younger counterparts, but there was no main effect of age 
in the Chinese sample. Thus, although their results were not fully supported, they still 
suggest that attributional differences observed in older individuals are due to being 
increasingly entrenched within one’s culture instead of reduced cognitive abilities. 
In contrast, research by Kitayama and colleagues (n.d.) suggests that older 
Americans are actually more likely to make situational attributions than their younger 
counterparts. This study had participants attribute causality to an actor or the context 
using four vignettes that described either positive or negative behavior. Interestingly, 
these age effects were more pronounced for the dispositional attributions than the 
situational attributions. 
Gender. There appears to be limited research examining gender difference in 
causal attributions for the behavior of other individuals. However, there is a body of 
research indicating that women, compared to men, are more likely to make situational 
attributions regarding their own success. Frieze, Whitley, Hanusa, & McHugh (1982) 
conducted a meta-analyses examining gender differences in how people attribute their 
own successes and failures. The two consistent sex differences indicated that men are 
more likely to make stronger attributions regarding their own ability (dispositional 
attributions) whereas women are more likely to attribute their own performance to luck 
(situational attribution).   
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Present Research 
 The variability in the application of the legal doctrines of contributory negligence, 
comparative negligence (in all its various forms), joint and several liability, and several 
liability suggests that the issue of how to apportion responsibility between multiple 
tortfeasors and a negligent plaintiff in complex negligent tort cases is not a 
straightforward task. The complexity of law suggests that there is not a universally 
understood correct way to apportion responsibility. Instead, jurisdictions and policy 
makers seem to adopt a multitude of different doctrines.  
 Although the fundamental attribution error and correspondence bias may be 
highly prevalent in some cultures, they may be attenuated or even absent in others. 
Recent social and cultural psychology findings support the assertion that cultural groups 
vary in their causal attributions. Some cultural groups are dispositionally focused whereas 
others are situationally focused. These cultural differences are observed in group 
affiliation based on gender, race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and age.  
Research Objective  
This dissertation has three aims:  (1) to examine how culturally derived 
attributional tendencies influence jurors’ assessments of causation in complex negligent 
tort cases where there are multiple causal influences (i.e., multiple tortfeasors and 
plaintiff negligence);  (2) to study the implications of those causal determinations on 
liability determinations, damage awards, and other legal decisions; and (3) to determine 
whether these culturally derived attributional tendencies are malleable, suggesting an 
intervention that might be used to attenuate the influence of attributional tendencies in a 
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trial setting. To achieve these aims, it is also necessary to develop a new scale to measure 
attributional tendencies.  
Contributions to Psychological and Legal Theory 
Although the body of research on cultural differences in attributional tendencies 
continues to expand, there has yet to be any studies examining the influence of culturally 
derived attributional tendencies on legal decision-making in the area of negligent tort 
law. Further, although the research indicates that situationally focused cultures tend to 
have increased causal complexity (Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto, & Park, 2003), research has 
not examined how attributional tendencies influence assessments of social causation 
when there are multiple causal influences involved in a complex situation.  
This research seeks to advance our understanding of cultural differences in 
attributional tendencies. First, it examines cultural differences in attributional tendencies 
in a domain yet unexplored: juror decision-making in negligent tort cases. Second, this 
work develops a new measure of individual differences in attributional tendencies, so that 
the influence of cultural affiliation on attributional tendencies and the implication for 
downstream decision-making can be tested using a mediation model. In so doing, it is 
also possible to examine whether dispositional and situational attributional tendencies are 
unidimensional, or distinct components of social attributions. Third, the research on 
cultural differences in attributional tendencies has yet to explore the implications of those 
attributional tendencies on target perceptions when there are multiple causal influences. 
Often, causal influences in the real world are complex and multidimensional. They can 
involve multiple actors, situational influences, and so on. Thus, to better understand the 
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influence of a perceiver’s attributional tendencies on real world decision-making, it is 
important to develop studies that test perceptions in a causally complex situation. 
This research also seeks to advance legal theory. Although there is psychology 
and law research examining the influence of cognitive biases on legal judgment and 
decision-making, this research has yet to explore the influence of cultural differences. As 
mentioned, American citizens and the American jury pool are becoming increasingly 
diverse. Thus, it is also important to empirically explore the implications of these 
differences. In so doing, it may be possible to explain and even predict some of the 
observed differences in juror decisions.  
Hypotheses 
The hypotheses of interest in this dissertation are summarized in Table 2. To 
examine the influence of culturally derived attributional tendencies on juror’s decision-
making in a complex negligent tort case, I propose a model in which an individual’s 
cultural group affiliation influences his or her attributional tendencies. For example, 
Asians, working-class people, and women will be more situationally focused, whereas 
Westerners, upper-class people, and men will be more dispositionally focused. Further, I 
propose that these attributional tendencies will influence causal determinations in 
complex negligent tort cases. As indicated by the reviewed literature, individuals from 
cultures with dispositional tendencies are more likely to attribute causes internally to the 
individual rather than the situation. Those who are dispositionally focused are more likely 
to find that a defendant caused the harm to the plaintiff. Further, the literature on causal 
complexity also suggests that those who are dispositionally focused are more likely to 
attribute the causal link to a single actor, rather than multiple actors. Thus, I am 
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predicting that there is a relationship between cultural affiliation and causal determination 
and that an individual’s attributional tendency mediates that relationship. 
Finally, I predict that these causal determinations will influence downstream 
decision-making. I hypothesize that, compared to individuals from situationally focused 
cultures, individuals from dispositionally focused cultures are: (1) less likely to attribute 
some portion of the cause of the harm to other actors; (2) more likely to hold the 
defendant responsible for the harm; (3) more likely to find the defendant liable; and (4) 
more likely to hold the defendant financially responsible for a greater amount. Further, I 
hypothesize that an individual’s attributional tendency mediates this relationship such 
that individuals who are primarily socialized in Western cultures, men, those from higher 
social classes, and those who are older will be more dispositionally focused resulting in 
them being less likely to attribute some portion of the causal influence and responsibility 
of the harm to outside influences and more likely to find the defendant liable and 
financially responsible for the harm.  
I conducted three studies to test these hypotheses. The first two studies examined 
the influence of attributional tendencies on apportioning causation and responsibility 
between multiple causal influences and consequential downstream assessments of 
liability and financial responsibility. Using a car accident scenario, Study 1 also 
examined the influence of within-nation cultural differences—based on gender, 
socioeconomic status, and age—on attributional tendencies. Using the same scenario as 
Study 1 and an additional version of the scenario, Study 2 examined cultural differences 
in ethnic groups by comparing Caucasian and Asian participants. Study 2 also tested 
whether attributional tendencies affect how participants apportions responsibility between 
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multiple causal influences and downstream assessments of liability and financial 
responsibility. Finally, Study 3 used a priming paradigm on the scenario used in Study 1 
in an American sample to see if attributional tendencies are malleable.  
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STUDY 1 
The primary purpose of this study was to determine whether attributional 
tendencies influence how a participant apportions responsibility between multiple causal 
influences. Apportioning perceived causal influence and responsibility between multiple 
causal influences is an unexplored area in attribution research, thus it was necessary to 
develop measures for examining apportioning of perceived causal influence and 
responsibility. This preliminary study tested these measures using a simplified scenario 
involving a car accident.   
To achieve this goal, it was also necessary to develop a measure of attributional 
tendency. The literature on cultural differences in attributional tendencies uses several 
measurement techniques to determine attributional tendencies, but there is not a widely-
accepted scale.1 Many studies use the attitude attribution paradigm (e.g., Blanchard-
Fields et al., 2007; Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002) or have 
participants respond to vignettes (e.g., Grossmann & Varnum, 2011; Kitayama et al., 
2006) to assess attributional tendencies. In addition, paragraph-long descriptions of 
dispositionism, situationism, and interactionism developed by Norenzayan, Choi, and 
Nisbett (2002) have been used to assess attributional tendencies.2 However, this measure 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that there is a recently developed Situationism Scale (Roberts, Gibbons, Gerrard, & 
Klein, 2015). However, this scale only includes situationism items to measure belief in the importance of 
context for behavior. It does not include items that assess dispositionism.  
 
2 For example, the dispositionism paragraph states: 
How people behave is mostly determined by their personality. One’s personality predisposes and 
guides an individual to behave in one way, not in another way, no matter what circumstances the 
person is in. In a sense, behavior is an unfolding of personality. One’s behavior is remarkably 
stable across time and consistent across situations because it is guided by personality. Therefore, if 
we know the personality of one person, we can easily predict how the person will behave in the 
future and explain why that person behaved in the particular way in the past. 
Participants were asked to rate their agreement with this paragraph.  
  35 
is doubled-barreled and pilot testing suggested that it was difficult for participants to 
respond to these items because of its double-barreled nature.  
A scale based measure of attributional tendencies would also be useful in 
determining whether attributional tendencies are unidimensional (with dispositional and 
situational tendencies being two ends of a continuum) or multidimensional (with 
dispositionism and situationism as distinct constructs). Often, the literature discusses 
attributional tendencies as though it is unidimensional, and there are some findings that 
support that conclusion. However, there are some studies which suggest that 
dispositionism and situationism have unique findings (e.g., Norenzaya, Choi, & Nisbett, 
2002). This question could be assessed during this scale construction process if 
appropriate nondouble-barreled items are used.  
Creating an attributional tendencies scale makes it possible to test the prediction 
that there is a relationship between cultural affiliation and an individual’s causal 
determination that is mediated by their individual attributional tendency. This study also 
included questions about downstream decision-making concerning liability assessments 
and damage awards to test those measures. 
Methods 
Participants 
 Two hundred and ten participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk and compensated $ 0.50 for their time. This sample consisted of participants from 
19 to 84 years old (M = 38.61; SD = 13.13). Of the participants, 52.4% reported they 
were female and 42.9% reported they were male (4.8% chose not to report their gender).  
The ethnic breakdown of the participants consisted of: 75.7% White/Caucasian; 10.0% 
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Black/African-American; 3.3% Hispanic/Latino; 2.9% East Asian, Southeast Asian, or 
Asian-American; 1.0% South Asian; 0.5% European or Australian; and 1.9% chose the 
“other” category (4.8% of participants did not indicate an ethnicity). Of the participants 
who responded, all indicated that they were United States citizens (5.2% of participants 
did not respond). This group of participants also indicated that they were from a 
somewhat diverse socioeconomic background. Responding to a self-reported measure of 
social class, 16.7% reported being Working Class, 26.2% reported being Lower Middle 
Class, 43.3% reported being Middle Class, 8.1% reported being Upper Middle Class, and 
0.5% reported being Upper Class. 
Design 
 This was a correlational design. All participants read the description of the car 
accident involving multiple causal influences; apportioned perceived causation and 
responsibility between those influences; determined whether the driver was negligent; 
assessed legal responsibility; and assigned the proportion of damages that the driver 
should be financially responsible for. Then, participants responded to the attributional 
tendencies scale and answered a series of demographic questions.  
Materials and Procedures 
 Appendix A contains the materials provided to the participants. This study was 
administered online through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk using Qualtrics survey software. 
Participants began the study by reading the directions and were then provided the 
following car accident scenario: 
It is early in the morning and Rick is speeding on a mostly empty two-lane road. 
The road is wet, and a dense fog has settled upon it. Up the road, a city bus has 
run out of gas and the bus driver has attempted to pull over to the shoulder. The 
bus, however, is still slightly blocking the roadway. Rick’s car hits the bus. 
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 After reading the scenario, the participants were asked the extent to which they 
believed that “each of the following factors caused the accident.” Then they assigned a 
percentage (totaling 100%) to each of the following factors: Rick’s driving, the road and 
weather conditions, the bus partially blocking the roadway, luck, and “other.” 
Participants were then asked to assess the same factors for the extent to which they 
believed that “each of the following factors should be considered responsible for the 
accident.” After apportioning perceived causation and responsibility, participants were 
then asked three questions regarding Rick’s responsibility for the accident. First, after 
being provided a definition of negligence, participants were asked whether Rick was 
negligent (responding “yes” or “no”). Next, participants were asked the degree to which 
they agreed with the statement “Rick should be held legally responsible for hitting the 
bus” on a scale of 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Finally, the last 
question explained several liability (See Appendix A), described the damages from the 
accident as being worth about $100,000, and then asks “how much of the $100,000 in 
damages should Rick have to pay?” 
 After completing the questions regarding the car accident, participants were given 
the Attributional Tendency Scale. This initial version of the scale consists of eight 
statements that participants were asked to rate their agreement with on a scale of 1 
(“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”), including “how people behave is mostly 
determined by their personality” and “People in similar situations will behave similarly 
regardless of their personalities.” Following the scale, participants answered several 
demographic questions including questions about their age, gender, ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, citizenship, political affiliation, and religion. Socioeconomic status 
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was measured using five questions that assessed parental education (mother and father), 
subjective social class, current family yearly income, and childhood parental yearly 
income. Participants were then debriefed and provided an individualized survey code that 
allowed them to receive payment through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for completing the 
survey. 
Results 
Factor Structure of the Attributional Tendency Scale 
 To test the factor structure of the items of the Attributional Tendency Scale 
developed for these studies, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on the eight 
items using Principal Axis Factoring to determine whether the scale is unidimensional as 
predicted. A Direct Oblimin rotation was used allowing the factors to correlate. The 
analysis extracted three initial factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1: the first factor 
explained 32.89% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.63), the second explained 22.05% of 
the variance (eigenvalue = 1.76), and the third factor explained 12.91% of the variance 
(eigenvalue = 1.03). Table 3 displays the factor loadings from the Pattern Matrix of each 
item on the three extracted factors. The first factor contained the four dispositionally 
focused items loading positively, with all loadings over .30. None of the situationally 
focused items loaded with a value of greater than +/- .30. The second factor consisted of 
three situationally focused items loading negatively, all with loadings over - .75. The only 
situationally focused item to not load with a value of greater than +/- .30 on this factor 
was “People in similar situations will behave similarly regardless of their personalities” 
with a factor loading of -.224. Thus, although small in magnitude, this item did load in 
the appropriate direction. The loadings from the first two factors suggest that 
  39 
dispositionism and situationism are not unidimensional. Instead, they are distinct 
concepts that load on separate factors. 
Finally, a third factor emerged for which the eigenvalue was barely over the 
standard cutoff of 1. It only had two items with loadings more extreme than +/- .30: “An 
individual’s behavior is generally stable across time and situations” (loading = .713) and 
“People in similar situations will behave similarly regardless of their personalities” 
(loading = .807). Although this is an unpredicted factor with an eigenvalue just above the 
cutoff, the most likely interpretation is that this factor is accessing perceptions of stability 
in behavior across time and situations. 
In addition to the exploratory analyses, I conducted a one-factor (with six items), 
two two-factor (one with all 8 items and the other with the 6 items that load on the first 
two factors of the EFAs) and a three-factor Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFAs) on the 
data, using maximum likelihood as the estimation procedure. To test the fit of the data, I 
examined the Chi-Square Test of Model Fit, for which values closer to zero indicate a 
better fit. I also examined two other model fit indices that are not influenced by sample 
size and have different measurement properties: the comparative fit index (CFI) and the 
root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & 
Bentler, 1999; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). The CFI compares the fit of the estimated 
model to the fit of the independence model (where all variables are unrelated) using a 
noncentral χ2 distribution; possible values range from 0 – 1, with larger numbers 
indicating better model fit. A CFI of .90 or greater is generally thought to indicate good 
fit of the model to the data, with values greater than .95 indicating excellent fit. I also 
examined the RMSEA which compares the estimated model to a perfect (i.e., saturated) 
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model. Smaller RMSEA values represent better fitting models and values between .06 
and .10 are generally thought to indicate a reasonable degree of fit, with values less than 
.06 indicating very close fit to the data. 
First, I ran the one-factor six-item CFA with all items loading on one factor with 
the situationally focused items reverse coded. The one factor model indicated χ2(9) = 
124.69, p < .01. Further, the fit indices for this model showed a CFI of .58 and an 
RMSEA value of .25. These fit indices suggest that a one-factor model is a poor fit for 
the data.  
Next, I ran a two-factor CFA with all 8 items loading on two factors such that the 
four dispositionally focused items loaded on one factor and the four situationally focused 
items on the other. This model indicated χ2(19) = 56.18, p < .01. Further, the fit indices 
for this model showed a CFI of .89 and an RMSEA value of .10. Although the RMSEA 
suggests that this is a reasonable fit, the CFI does not indicate a good fit, although it is 
better than in the one-factor model. Thus, this model is better than the one-factor model, 
but is still a poor fit.  
Third, I ran a second two-factor CFA that consisted of the six items that had high 
loading on the first two factors of the EFAs. Three of the items loaded on the 
dispositionally focused factor and the other three loaded on the situationally focused 
factor. This model indicated χ2(8) = 25.06, p < .01, and the fit indices for this model 
showed a CFI of .94 and an RMSEA value of .10. Both the CFI and the RMSEA for this 
model indicates a good fit and fit the data better than the previous two models. 
Finally, I ran a three-factor CFA with all eight items reflecting the factors 
established in the EFA. The three-factor model indicated χ2(17) = 65.01, p < .01, and the 
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fit indices for this model showed CFI of .86 and an RMSEA value of .12. These model fit 
indices suggest that this is a poor fitting model. Again, this model did not perform as well 
as the six-item two-factor model. 
Previous literature leaves open the issue of whether dispositional tendencies and 
situational tendencies are unidimensional and two ends of a continuum or two distinct 
components. The fit indices from the CFA indicate that the two-factor six-item model 
best fits the data, suggesting that the Dispositional Tendency Subscale and Situational 
Tendency Subscale are measuring two unique concepts. However, I wanted to directly 
compare the two-factor six-item model (indicating two distinct components) to the one-
factor six-item (indicating unidimensionality). As these are nested models, it is possible 
to perform a Chi-Square difference test. There was a significant difference between the 
models, χ2(1) = 99.63, p < .01. This indicates that the two-factor six-item model best fit 
the data.  
Given the strength of the fit indices that emerged during the CFA for the two-
factor six-item model, the Attributional Tendency Scale (with two subscales) was created 
using only those six items.3 Dispositional Tendency Subscale and Situational Tendency 
Subscale scores were computed and used for data analyses. The Dispositional Tendency 
Subscale score was computed by averaging the three dispositionally focused items 
(Chronbach’s alpha = .72; M = 4.96; SD = .96). Similarly, the Situational Tendency 
Subscale score was computed by averaging the three situationally focused items 
                                                 
3 The six items included: Dispositionally Focused items – “How people behave is mostly determined by 
their personality,” “An individual’s personality predisposes them to act in specific ways,” and “An 
individual’s future behavior is predictable if you know his or her personality”; Situational Focused items – 
“Behavior can best be predicted by looking at situational factors,” “Behavior is primarily determined by the 
situations people find themselves in,” and “situational influences often have a large influence on someone’s 
behavior.” 
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(Chronbach’s alpha = .75; M = 4.78; SD = 1.01). These subscales were significantly 
correlated, r (199) = .19, p = .01. 
The Influence of Attributional Tendencies on Accident Judgments  
 The overall means for each of the accident judgments are reported in Table 4. To 
examine the relationship between attributional tendencies and the participants’ accident 
judgments, I ran a set of analyses with the Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores 
(DTS), Situational Tendency Subscale scores (STS), and an interaction term (DTSxSTS) 
predicting accident judgments. The results of these analyses (including betas, R2, and F 
values) are reported in Table 5.  
Attributional tendencies predicting distribution of perceived causal 
influence. After reading the accident scenario, participants were asked to assign a 
percentage of causal influence to five different possible contributing factors. Overall, 
participants attributed about half of the causal influence to Rick’s driving, M = 47.70, SD 
= 29.09. They then attributed about a quarter to the road and weather conditions (M = 
24.91, SD = 18.67) and just less than a quarter to the location of the bus (M = 21.89 SD = 
17.47). Only a very small amount of causal influence was attributed to luck (M = 4.01, 
SD = 7.51) or other factors (M = 1.48, SD = 5.58). 
Focusing on the influence of attributional tendencies, I hypothesized that 
participants who are more dispositionally focused would apportion a greater percent of 
the perceived cause of the accident to Rick’s driving (rather than the other four options: 
the road and weather conditions, the bus partially blocking the roadway, luck, and 
“other”) than participants who are situationally focused. Similarly, I predicted that 
situationally focused participants will apportion a greater percent of the perceived cause 
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of the accident to the other four factors, compared to those who are more dispositionally 
focused. As predicted, with regards to Rick’s driving, there was no effect of the 
interaction term, β < -.01, p = .99. But, both subscales were significant predictors for 
perceptions of Rick’s driving such that participants who showed more dispositional 
tendencies and less situational tendencies attributed a greater percent of the perceived 
causation of the accident to Rick’s driving (DTS: β = .17, p = .02; STS: β = -.19; p = .01; 
R2 (overall model) = .05, p = .02). 
Next, I ran a series of exploratory regression analyses examining the influence of 
attributional tendencies on attributions to the other possible factors. There was no 
influence of attributional tendencies on attributions of causation to the road and weather 
conditions, (DTS: β = -.10, p = .16; STS: β = .09; p = .22; DTSxSTS: β = -.01, p = .84; R2 
(overall model) = .02, p = .39). However, for the location of the bus, there was a 
marginally significant effect of the Dispositional Tendency Subscale. Those who were 
more dispositionally focused attributed less perceived causation of the accident to the bus 
blocking the roadway (DTS: β = -.13, p = .07; STS: β = .09; p = .23; DTSxSTS: β = -.01, 
p = .84; R2 (overall model) = .02, p = .20). Further, only the Situational Tendency 
Subscale predicted attributions to luck. Those who were more situationally focused 
attributed more perceived causation of the accident to luck (DTS: β = -.05, p = .48; STS: 
β = .19, p = .01; DTSxSTS: β = -.04, p = .60; R2 (overall model) = .07, p = .07). Finally, 
there was no influence of attributional tendencies on causal attributions to other factors 
(DTS: β = -.04, p = .63; STS: β = .11, p = .12; DTSxSTS: β = -.03, p = .71; R2 (overall 
model) = .01, p = .47). 
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Attributional tendencies predicting distribution of perceived responsibility. 
The next question asked participants to assign a percentage of responsibility to five 
different possible contributing factors. Overall, participants apportioned slightly more 
than half of the responsibility to Rick’s driving, M = 54.87, SD = 31.46. They then 
apportioned about 20% of the responsibility to the road and weather conditions (M = 
19.66, SD = 19.95) and the location of the bus (M = 20.15, SD = 19.81). Only a very 
small amount of responsibility was apportioned to luck (M = 3.02, SD = 7.08) or other 
factors (M = 1.85, SD = 8.68). 
I hypothesized that participants who are more dispositionally focused would 
apportion a greater percent of the perceived responsibility for the accident to Rick’s 
driving (rather than the other four options: the road and weather conditions, the bus 
partially blocking the roadway, luck, and “other”) than participants who are situationally 
focused. Similarly, I predicted that situationally focused participants would apportion a 
greater percent of the perceived responsibility for the accident to the other four factors 
compared to those who are more dispositionally focused. As predicted, with regards to 
Rick’s driving, there was no effect of the interaction term, β = -.06, p = .39. But, both 
subscales were significant predictors for perceptions of Rick’s driving (DTS: β = .15, p = 
.04; STS: β = -.20; p = .01; R2 (overall model) = .06, p = .01). Participants who showed 
more dispositional tendencies and less situational tendencies found Rick responsible for a 
greater proportion of the accident. 
Next, I ran a series of exploratory regression analyses examining the influence of 
attributional tendencies perceptions of responsibility for the other possible factors. There 
was no influence of the Situational Tendency Subscale or Interaction Term on 
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perceptions of responsibility for the road and weather conditions (STS: β = .06; p = .41; 
DTSxSTS: β = -.04, p = .57). However, there was a marginally significant effect of the 
Dispositional Tendency Subscale (DTS: β = -.13, p = .07; R2 (overall model) = .02, p = 
.28).  Those who were more dispositionally focused perceived the road and weather 
conditions as being less responsible for the accident. With regards to the location of the 
bus, there was no effect of the Dispositional Tendency Subscale, Situational Tendency 
Subscale, or Interaction Term (DTS: β = -.11, p = .11; STS: β = .10; p = .17; DTSxSTS: β 
= .09, p = .22; R2 (overall model) = .03, p = .14). Further, only the Situational Tendency 
Subscale predicted attributions to luck. Those who were more situationally focused 
apportioned more responsibility for the accident to luck (DTS: β = -.11, p = .13; STS: β = 
.18, p = .02; DTSxSTS: β = -.09, p = .21; R2 (overall model) = .04, p = .04). Similarly, 
only the Situational Tendency Subscale predicted attributions to “other”. Those who were 
more situationally focused apportioned more responsibility for the accident to other 
factors (DTS: β = .04, p = .61; STS: β = .17, p = .02; Interaction: β = .12, p = .09; R2 
(overall model) = .04, p = .02). 
Attributional tendencies predicting perceived legal responsibility. I also 
predicted that individuals who are dispositionally focused are more likely to agree that 
Rick should be held legally responsible for hitting the bus than individuals who are 
situationally focused. The regression analysis supported this hypothesis. I ran a 
regression analysis with the Dispositional Tendency Subscale, Situational Tendency 
Subscale, and the Interaction Term as the predictors. The results indicated that there was 
a significant effect of the Dispositional Tendency Subscale and the Interaction Term, 
however there was no effect of the Situational Tendency Subscale scores (DTS: β = .16, p 
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= .03; STS: β = -.10; p = .18; DTSxSTS: β = -.14; p = .05; R2 (overall model) = .05, p = 
.02). Those who were more dispositionally focused agreed more with holding Rick 
legally responsible for the accident. 
Attributional tendencies predicting amount of damages Rick should pay. 
Similarly, I also predicted that individuals who are dispositionally focused are going to 
find that Rick should pay a higher percent of the damages than individuals who are 
situationally focused. Again, the regression analysis supported this hypothesis. I ran a 
regression analyses with the Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores, Situational 
Tendency Subscale scores, and an Interaction Term as the predictors. The results 
indicated that the Situational Tendency Subscale influenced how much of the damages 
Rick should have to pay. As participants became more situationally focused, they 
required Rick to pay a lower amount of the damages (DTS: β = .07, p = .35; STS: β = -
.15; p = .04; DTSxSTS: β = -.05; p = .46; R2 (overall model) = .03, p = .13). 
Attributional tendencies predicting perceived negligence. Legally a negligence 
determination should be separate from issues of causation. However, lay decision-makers 
often struggle with making these types of fine, legal distinctions. To the extent a 
participant perceives other factors as a large influence on the outcome of the accident 
they are going to be less likely to think Rick’s actions were negligent. Therefore, I 
hypothesized that dispositionally focused individuals are less likely to find that Rick’s 
actions were negligent. I ran a logistic regression analyses with the Dispositional 
Tendency Subscale scores, Situational Tendency Subscale scores, and an Interaction 
Term as the predictors. The results indicated no significant effects (DTS: B = -.20, p = 
.34; STS: B = .156, p = .45; DTSxSTS: B = .182, p = .25; Nagelkerke R2 (overall model) 
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= .02.). Thus, perceptions of whether Rick’s actions were negligent were not influenced 
by the participants’ attributional tendencies. 
Cultural and Demographic Group Affiliation Predicting Attributional Tendencies 
To examine the relationship between cultural and demographic group affiliation 
and attributional tendencies, I ran a series of analyses in which group affiliation predicted 
Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores and Situational Tendency Subscale scores. I also 
ran a series of analyses utilizing the difference score between the Dispositional Tendency 
Subscale scores and Situational Tendency Subscale scores as the outcome variable. To 
compute this Difference Score, I subtracted the Situational Tendency Subscale Scores 
from the Dispositional Tendency Subscale score. A large, positive Difference Score 
indicates that a participant is more dispositionally focused, whereas a large, negative 
Difference Score indicates that a participant is more situationally focused. Scores near 
zero indicate that participants were either low or high on both subscales. Based on the 
literature, I predicted that those who are primarily socialized in Western cultures, men, 
those from higher social classes, and those who are younger will be more dispositionally 
focused than those who are primarily socialized in Eastern cultures, women, those from 
lower social classes, and those who are older.  
Cultural difference based on ethnic group. I was unable to examine the 
differences between Asian and Caucasian ethnic groups with this study. Although M-
Turk was intended to provide an ethnically diverse group, my sample lacked an adequate 
number of Asian participants to perform these analyses.  
Men vs. women. I predicted that men and women would differ in their 
attributional tendencies. To test this hypothesis, I ran a series of One-way Analysis of 
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Variances (ANOVA). Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 6. Contrary to 
the hypothesis, there was no difference in the Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores (F 
(1, 198) = .61, p = .44; Men: M = 5.02, SD = 1.03; Women: M = 4.91, SD = .91). Nor was 
there a difference between men and women in the Situational Tendency Subscale scores 
(F (1, 197) = .63, p = .43; Men: M = 4.72, SD = 1.04; Women: M = 4.83, SD = .98). 
Finally, there was also no observed gender difference for the Difference score (F (1, 197) 
= 1.57, p = .21; Men: M = .30, SD = 1.21; Women: M = .08, SD = 1.29). 
Socioeconomic status. I also hypothesized that socioeconomic status influences 
attributional tendencies such that higher socioeconomic status individuals are more 
dispositionally focused. To compute a measure of socioeconomic status, a composite 
score was created using the z-scores of five different socioeconomic status measure 
(Chronbach’s alpha = .71). The correlations for the five socioeconomic status measure 
and the composite measure are reported in Table 7. First, I ran two separate regression 
analyses with the Socioeconomic Status Composite score predicting Dispositional 
Tendency Subscale scores and Situational Tendency Subscale scores. There was a 
marginally significant influence of the Socioeconomic Status Composite on the 
Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores, such that higher socioeconomic status 
individuals were more dispositionally focused (β = .12, R2 (overall model) = .01, p = .09). 
However, there was no influence of socioeconomic status on Situational Tendency 
Subscale scores (β = .01, R2 (overall model) <.01, p = .90). Next, I ran a regression 
analysis with the Socioeconomic Status Composite score predicting the Difference score. 
Again, contrary to the hypothesis, there was no influence of socioeconomic status on the 
Difference scores (β = .08, R2 (overall model) =.01, p = .25). 
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Age. Finally, the literature also suggests that attributional tendencies may vary 
based on age. Although there is some evidence that older Americans are more 
dispositional, the stronger evidence suggests that older Americans are more situationally 
focused than younger Americans. First, I ran two separate regression analyses with age 
predicting Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores and Situational Tendency Subscale 
scores. There was no difference in the Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores (β = -.08, 
R2 (overall model) = .01, p = .27) or in the Situational Tendency Subscale scores (β = -
.04, R2 (overall model) < .01, p = .54) based on age. Next, I ran a regression analysis with 
age predicting the Difference score. Again, contrary to the hypothesis, there was no 
influence of age on the Difference scores (β = -.02, R2 (overall model) <.01, p = .74). 
Cultural and Demographic Group Affiliation Predicting Accident Judgments 
Finally, to examine the direct relationship between cultural and demographic 
group affiliation and the accident judgments, I ran a series of analyses in which group 
affiliation predicted the accident judgments. Based on the literature, I predicted that those 
who are primarily socialized in Western cultures, men, those from higher social classes, 
and those who are younger would attribute more causal influence to Rick, apportion a 
large percentage of perceived responsibility to Rick, perceive Rick as more legally 
responsible, and request that Rick pay a higher proportion of the damages.  
Cultural difference based on ethnic group. Again, I was unable to examine the 
differences between Asian and Caucasian ethnic groups with this study. Although M-
Turk was intended to provide an ethnically diverse group, my sample lacked an adequate 
number of Asian participants to perform these analyses.  
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Men vs. women. To test my gender hypothesis, I ran a series of ANOVAs 
examining the differences between men and women on the accident judgments. The 
results, along with the group means and standard deviations, are reported in Table 8. 
Contrary to my hypotheses, there were no gender differences observed for attributions of 
causal influence to Rick, apportionments of percentage of perceived responsibility to 
Rick, perceiving Rick as more legally responsible, and requesting that Rick pay a higher 
proportion of the damages (see Table 8).  
However, there were a few significant exploratory analyses. First, there was a 
marginally significant effect indicating that women (M = 26.97, SD = 19.50) attributed 
more causal influence to the road and weather conditions than men (M = 22.44, SD = 
17.92), F (1, 198) = 2.87, p = .09. Second, women attributed significantly less causal 
influence to luck (F (1, 198) = 4.32, p = .04; Women: M = 3.04, SD = 6.65; Men: M = 
5.26, SD = 8.45) and other factors (F (1, 198) = 4.40, p = .04; Women: M = .77, SD = 
3.26; Men: M = 2.44, SD = .77) than men.  Similarly, women (M = 22.24, SD = 20.88) 
apportioned more responsibility to the road and weather conditions than men (M = 16.57, 
SD = 17.92), F (1, 198) = 4.03, p = .05. Women also apportioned less responsibility to 
luck than men. (F (1, 197) = 3.76, p = .05; Women: M = .73, SD = 3.25; Men: M = 3.12, 
SD = 12.35). 
Socioeconomic status. I tested the socioeconomic hypothesis using a series of 
regression analyses in which the Socioeconomic Status Composite score predicted the 
accident judgments. The results of these analyses (including betas, R2, and F values) are 
reported in Table 9. Contrary to my hypotheses, there were no effects of socioeconomic 
status on attributions of causal influence to Rick, apportionments of percentage of 
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perceived responsibility to Rick, perceiving Rick as more legally responsible, and 
requesting that Rick pay a higher proportion of the damages (see Table 9). Nor were there 
any significant effects in the exploratory analyses for attributions of causation or 
apportionments of responsibility.  
Age. I tested the age hypothesis using a series of regression analyses in which age 
predicted the accident judgments. The results of these analyses (including betas, R2, and 
F values) are reported in Table 10. There was a significant effect of age on attributions of 
causation to Rick’s driving β = .18, R2 (overall model) = .03, p = .01. Older participants 
attributed more causal influence to Rick’s driving than younger participants. Exploratory 
analyses suggest that older participants also attributed less causal influence to luck (β = -
.20, R2 (overall model) = .04, p < .01) and other factors (β = -.24, R2 (overall model) = 
.06, p < .01) than younger participants. 
Similarly, there was a significant effect of age on apportionments of responsibility 
to Rick’s driving β = .15, R2 (overall model) = .02, p = .04. Older participants 
apportioned more responsibility to Rick’s driving than younger participants. Exploratory 
analyses suggest that older participants also apportioned less responsibility to other 
influences (β = -.17, R2 (overall model) = .03, p = .01) than younger participants. There 
was also a marginally significant effect of age on perceptions of legal responsibility. 
Older participants were more likely to hold Rick legally responsible for his actions, β = 
.13, R2 (overall model) = .02, p = .07. 
Study 1 Discussion 
Several interesting findings emerged in Study 1. First, although dispositional and 
situational attribution styles are often discussed as being unidimensional, the factor 
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structure of the Attributional Tendency Scale suggests they are distinct concepts loading 
on two separate factors.  
Second, the overall means for the apportionments of causation and responsibility 
indicate that participants attributed about half of the total causation and responsibility to 
Rick’s driving. Then, about a quarter was apportioned to the road and weather conditions 
and slightly less than that was apportioned to the location of the bus. Only very small 
amounts (less than 5%) was apportioned to luck or other factors. As predicted, 
apportionments of causation and responsibility to Rick’s driving was influence by 
attributional tendencies. Participants who were more dispositionally focused and less 
situationally focused apportioned more causation and responsibility to Rick’s driving. 
Similarly, participants who were more dispositionally focused were more likely to agree 
that Rick should be held legally responsible. However, it was those who were more 
situationally focused who determined that Rick should pay less in damages.  
Contrary to my predictions, cultural and demographic group affiliation—based on 
gender, socioeconomic status, and age—did not predict Dispositional Tendency Subscale 
and Situational Tendency Subscale scores. Further, gender and socioeconomic status 
failed to predict differences in attributions of causal influence to Rick, apportionments of 
percentage of perceived responsibility to Rick, perceiving Rick as more legally 
responsible, and requesting that Rick pay a higher proportion of the damages. However, 
older participants attributed more causal influence to Rick and apportioned a larger 
percentage of perceived responsibility to Rick than their younger counterparts. 
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STUDY 2 
The results of Study 1 indicated that attributional tendencies influenced accident 
judgments. However, Study 1 largely failed to establish a link between cultural and 
demographic group affiliation and attributional tendencies, and there was not a consistent 
influence of cultural and demographic group affiliation on accident judgments. There are 
a few factors that could have contributed to the failure to replicate past research. First, the 
sample size for Study 1 was modest given the likelihood of small effect sizes. Second, the 
Attributional Tendency Scale used in Study 1 is a new measure that has not been used in 
past literature. Third, the lack of enough Asian participants in Study 1 made it impossible 
to examine cultural differences based on ethnic group affiliation. 
Thus, Study 2 replicates and extends the findings of Study 1 by explicitly 
comparing Caucasian and Asian attributional tendencies and the influence of those 
tendencies on how participants apportion perceived causation, apportion perceived 
responsibility, assess liability, and distribute financial responsibility. Like Study 1, Study 
2 is also intended to examine the effects of gender, socioeconomic status, and age.  
Study 2 also extends Study 1 by including a new version of the scenario, in 
addition to the original version. The original version clearly indicated negligence per se 
on the part of Rick because it stated that he was speeding. It also implicated the bus 
driver as being negligent for having failed to completely pull over to the shoulder, thus he 
was still blocking the roadway. The scenario was modified to remove both elements, 
making the scenario more ambiguous with the intent of increasing the potential for 
attributional tendencies to influence participant’s accident judgments. 
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Finally, Study 2 also continues to explore the use of the Attributional Tendency 
Scale as a measure of attributional tendencies. This study will also include several other 
measures approximating attributional tendencies in order to establish convergent and 
discriminant validity. These measures include the Situationism Scale (Roberts, Gibbons, 
Gerrard, & Klein, 2015), Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966), and four 
vignettes that were used to measure attributional tendencies in previous cross-cultural 
studies (e.g., Grossmann & Varnum, 2011). This study will explore the relationship 
between these measures and the new Attributional Tendency Scale. 
Methods 
Participants 
To collect a more ethnically diverse sample, participants were recruited from the 
Psychology 101 subject pool at Arizona State University. Historically, the subject pool 
has included a relatively large number of Asian ethnicity students. Participants in this 
subject pool are awarded research participation credit for their psychology 101 course in 
exchange for completing the study (0.5 credits for this study). In total, 549 participants 
completed this study. They ranged in age from 18 to 46 (M = 19.47; SD = .248). Of the 
participants, 51.0% reported they were female and 47.9% reported they were male (1.1% 
chose not to report their gender).  The ethnic breakdown of the participants consisted of: 
48.5% White/Caucasian; 2.6% Black/African-American; 14.9% Hispanic/Latino; 0.20% 
Native American; 16.2% East Asian; 4.0% Southeast Asian; 4.6% Asian-American; 4.0% 
South Asian; 2.0% Middle Eastern/Arab/Arab American; 0.2% European or Australian; 
0.4% African; and 1.5% chose the “other” category (1.1% of participants did not indicate 
an ethnicity). This group of participants also indicated that they were from a somewhat 
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diverse socioeconomic background. Responding to a self-reported measure of social 
class, 2.4% reported being Lower Class, 15.4% reported being Lower Middle Class, 
41.2% reported being Middle Class, 35.1% reported being Upper Middle Class, and 4.9% 
reported being Upper Class. 
In past studies, the psychology 101 subject pool has indicated high rates of 
random responding (e.g. Votruba & Kwan, 2015). Therefore, precautions were taken to 
prevent and detect random responders. First, this study was administered at the beginning 
of the Spring semester (during late January and early February). The beginning of the 
semester captures students who are motivated to complete this requirement early. It is 
also a time when students are less encumbered with exams and large projects. Second, the 
study included a catch questions to detect random responding. Around the middle of the 
study, hidden in a matrix of questions asking participants to indicate their agreement with 
scale items (on a 1 to 7 scale of “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”), participants 
were told “If you are reading this statement, please select Disagree.” Participants who fail 
to select “Disagree” to this item are believed to be randomly responding and are removed 
from the sample prior to data analysis. Four hundred and ninety-three participants 
(89.8%) responded to this item with “Disagree” and their data is reported in the results 
section.  
Design 
This study will consist of a one-factor between-subjects design where the scenario 
is manipulated. Half of the participants received the original scenario and the other half 
received the ambiguous scenario, which removed any direct indication that Rick was 
speeding and that the bus was blocking the roadway. Like Study 1, in addition to the 
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outcome measures (accident judgments) this study measured attributional tendencies 
(using multiple scales in this study) and cultural and demographic group affiliation. More 
specifically, this study attempted to oversample Asian participants so that a direct 
comparison could be made between Caucasians and Asians. 
Materials and Procedures 
 The materials for Study 2 can be found in Appendix B. This study was 
administered online through Sona System using Qualtrics survey software. Participants 
began the study by reading the directions and then reading an accident scenario. Half of 
the participants read the same scenario involving a car accident that was presented in 
Study 1. The other half read an ambiguous version which removed any direct indication 
that Rick was speeding and that the bus was blocking the roadway:  
It is early in the morning and Rick is driving on a mostly empty two-lane road. 
The road is wet, and a dense fog has settled upon it. Up the road, a city bus has 
run out of gas and the bus driver has pulled over to the shoulder. Rick’s car hits 
the bus. 
 
After reading the scenario, the participants were asked nearly the same questions 
that were presented after the scenario in Study 1. Like Study 1, the participants were 
asked the extent to which they believe that “each of the following factors caused the 
accident.” Then they assigned a percentage (totaling 100%) to each of the following 
factors: Rick’s driving, the road and weather conditions, the location of the bus, luck, and 
“other.” Participants were then asked to assess the same factors for the extent to which 
they believe that each of the following factors should be considered “at fault” (a new 
question) and “responsible” for the accident.  
After apportioning perceived causation, fault, and responsibility, participants were 
then asked five questions specifically about holding Rick responsible for the accident. 
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First, after being provided a definition of negligence, participants were asked whether 
Rick was negligent (responding “yes” or “no”). Next, participants were asked the degree 
to which they agree with the following statements: “Rick should be held legally 
responsible for hitting the bus,” “Rick is to blame for the accident,” and “Rick’s actions 
were inappropriate” on a scale of 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Finally, 
the last question explained several liability (See Appendix B), described the damages 
from the accident as being worth about $100,000, and then asks “how much of the 
$100,000 in damages should Rick have to pay?” 
Then, participants were given the same Attributional Tendency Scale created for 
Study 1. In addition, however, participants were asked to respond to several other scales 
and scenarios that measured attributional tendencies and related characteristics. First, 
participants responded to the Situationism Scale (Roberts, Gibbons, Gerrard, & Klein, 
2015). This 13-item scale measures lay situationism—the belief in the importance of a 
behavior’s context—regarding the participant’s own behavior. Participants rated their 
agreement on a scale of 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”) to items such as “I 
pay attention to relationships between my environment and my behavior” and “When my 
self-control fails, it is partly due to my current surroundings.” Second, participants were 
asked to complete Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966). This scale measures 
the extent to which people believe they can control the events of their lives compared to 
the extent they believe the events are beyond their control. This 29-item sale asks 
participants to choose one of two statements which they “believe to be more true than the 
other one.” For example, participants are asked to choose between “many of the unhappy 
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things in people’s lives are partly due to bad luck” and “people’s misfortunes result from 
the mistakes they make.”  
Finally, participants were also provided four vignettes that were used to measure 
attributional tendencies in previous cross-cultural studies (e.g., Grossman & Varnum, 
2011). Each of these vignettes described a situation and an individual’s behavior. It then 
asks participants to indicate their agreement with four items on a 1 (“strongly disagree”) 
to 7 (“strongly agree”) scale. Two of these items measured dispositional tendencies (e.g., 
“Sara Martin’s personality primarily influenced her behavior” and “Sara Martin would 
have acted differently if her personality had been different”) and the other two measured 
situational tendencies (e.g., “Particular circumstances primarily influenced Sara Martin’s 
behavior” and “Sara Martin would have acted differently if the particular circumstances 
had been different”). 
Following the scales, participants answered several demographic questions, 
including questions about their age, gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, citizenship, 
political affiliation, and religion. Socioeconomic status was measured using four 
questions that assessed parental education (mother and father), subjective social class, 
and current family yearly income. Participants were then debriefed and routed back to 
Sona Systems to automatically receive credit for having completed the study. 
Results 
Factor Structure of the Attributional Tendency Scale 
 To test the factor structure of the items of the Attributional Tendency Scale 
developed for these studies, I once again conducted an EFA on the 8 items using 
Principal Axis Factoring to determine whether the scale is unidimensional as predicted. A 
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Direct Oblimin rotation was used, allowing the factors to correlate. The analysis extracted 
three initial factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1: the first factor explained 30.70% of 
the variance (eigenvalue = 2.46), the second explained 17.27% of the variance 
(eigenvalue = 1.38), and the third factor explained 14.46% of the variance (eigenvalue = 
1.16). Table 11 displays the factor loadings of each item on the three extracted factors. 
The first factor contained three of the dispositionally focused items loading positively, 
with all loadings over .30. Unlike Study 1, however, the item “An individual’s behavior 
is generally stable across time and situations” had a loading of only .261. None of the 
situationally focused items loaded with a value of greater than +/- .30 on this first factor. 
The second factor consisted of the same three situationally focused items loading 
negatively, all with loadings greater than -.65. Again, the only situationally focused item 
to not load with a value of greater than +/- .30 on this factor was “People in similar 
situations will behave similarly regardless of their personalities” with a factor loading of -
.188. Thus, although small in magnitude, this item did load in the appropriate direction. 
Again, the loadings from the first two factors suggest that dispositionism and situationism 
are not unidimensional. Instead, they are distinct concepts that load on separate factors. 
Finally, a third factor emerged with the two items not loading on the other two 
factors: “An individual’s behavior is generally stable across time and situations” (loading 
= .757) and “People in similar situations will behave similarly regardless of their 
personalities” (loading = .874). These are the same items that emerged as a third factor in 
Study 1, and the most likely interpretation is that this factor is accessing perceptions of 
stability in behavior across time and situations. 
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In addition to running an exploratory analysis on the whole sample, I ran 
individual exploratory analyses for the Caucasian participants (n = 252) and Asian 
participants (n = 127). Although this created a significantly reduced sample size for the 
analyses, it provided the opportunity to see if the factor structure holds in these two 
cultural groups. As with the first analysis, I conducted an EFA on the 8 items using 
Principal Axis Factoring and a Direct Oblimin rotation was used allowing the factors to 
correlate. In each of the subsamples, a nearly identical three-factor structure emerged. 
The only difference was that situational tendencies emerged as the first factor and 
dispositional tendencies emerged as the second. This suggests that the factor structure 
holds across these cultural groups. 
To further explore the structure of the Attributional Tendency Scale, I conducted 
a one-factor, two two-factor (one with all eight items and the other with the six items that 
load on the first two factors of the EFAs) and a three-factor CFAs on the data, using 
maximum likelihood as the estimation procedure. As with Study 1, I examined two 
model fit indices that are not influenced by sample size and have different measurement 
properties: the CFI and the RMSEA (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999; 
Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).  
First, I ran the one-factor six-item CFA with all items loading on one factor with 
the situationally focused items reverse coded. The one factor model indicated χ2(9) = 
97.82, p < .01. Further, the fit indices for this model showed a CFI of .78 and an RMSEA 
value of .14. These fit indices suggest that a one-factor model is a poor fit for the data. 
Next, I ran a two-factor CFA with all eight items loading on two factors such that 
the four dispositionally focused items loaded on one factor and the four situationally 
  61 
focused items on the other. This model indicated χ2(19) = 112.42, p < .01. Further, the fit 
indices for this model showed a CFI of .83 and an RMSEA value of .10. Although the 
RMSEA suggests that this is a reasonable fit, the CFI does not indicate a good fit.  
The second two-factor CFA consisted of the six items that had consistently high 
load on the first two factors of the EFAs. Three of the items loaded on the dispositionally 
focused factor and the other three loaded on the situationally focused factor. This model 
indicated χ2(8) = 12.74, p = .12, and the fit indices for this model showed a CFI of .99 
and an RMSEA value of .04, indicating an excellent fit, and a better fit for the data than 
the previous two models. 
Finally, I ran a three-factor CFA with all eight items reflecting the factors 
established in the EFA. The three-factor model indicated χ2(17) = 53.31, p < .01. The fit 
indices for this model showed CFI of .94 and an RMSEA value of .07. Although better 
than the two-factor model with all eight items, this model did not perform as well as the 
two-factor model with six items. 
As with Study 1, I wanted to directly compare the two-factor six-item model 
(indicating two distinct components) to the one-factor six-item (indicating 
unidimensionality). Because these are nested models, it is possible to perform a Chi-
Square difference test. There was a significant difference between the models, χ2(1) = 
85.08, p < .01. This indicates that the two-factor six-item model best fit the data.  
Given the strength of the fit indices that emerged during the CFA for the two-
factor six-item, again the Attributional Tendency Scale (with two subscales) was 
computed using only those six items. The Dispositional Tendency Subscale score was 
computed by averaging the three dispositionally focused items (Chronbach’s alpha = .63; 
  62 
M = 4.96; SD = .86). Similarly, the Situational Tendency Subscale score was computed 
by averaging the three situationally focused items (Chronbach’s alpha = .70; M = 5.26; 
SD = .83). This created Subscale scores on a scale of 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 
(“strongly agree”). These subscales were significantly correlated, r (484) = .33, p < .01. 
Comparison of the Attributional Tendency Scale to Related Measures 
In addition to the Attributional Tendencies Scale, this study included the 
Situationism Scale (Roberts, Gibbons, Gerrard, & Klein, 2015) (13-items; Chronbach’s 
alpha = .67; M = 4.83; SD = .59), Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale (Rotter, 1966) (23-
items; Chronbach’s alpha = .60; M = 11.54; SD = 3.43), and four vignettes that were used 
to measure attributional tendencies in previous cross-cultural studies (e.g., Grossmann & 
Varnum, 2011) (Dispositionism Measure: 8-items; Chronbach’s alpha = .78; M = 4.78; 
SD = .88; Situationism Measure: 8-items; Chronbach’s alpha = .79; M = 5.25; SD = .82). 
These scales were included to examine convergent and discriminant validity. The 
Situationism Scale and Grossmann & Varnum’s Measures of dispositionism and 
situationism measure attributional focus and should be significantly correlated with the 
Attributional Tendency Scale. Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale, however, measures the 
extent to which people believe they can control the events of their lives compared to the 
extent they believe the events are beyond their control. Although a related concept, it is 
distinct from attributional focus. Thus, there should not be a relationship between 
Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale and the Attributional Tendency Scale. 
Each scale was appropriately scored and a series of Pearson’s r correlations were 
conducted. The correlations are reported in Table 12. As predicted, the Dispositional 
Tendency Subscale was positively correlated with Grossmann & Varnum’s 
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Dispositionism Measure, r = .31, p < .01. Also as predicted, it was not correlated with 
Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale, r = -.02, p > .05. Further, the Situational Tendency 
Subscale was positively correlated with the Situationism Scale (r = .30, p < .01) and 
Grossmann & Varnum’s Situationism Measure (r = .28, p < .01). It was not correlated 
with Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale, r = .07, p > .05. 
The Influence of Attributional Tendencies on Accident Judgments  
The means of each scenario (Original and Ambiguous) for each of the accident 
judgments are reported in Table 4. First, I ran a series of regression analyses with 
Scenario, the Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores, the Situational Tendency 
Subscales scores, a Scenario by Dispositional Tendency Subscale interaction term, and a 
Scenario by Situational Tendency Subscale interaction term. These analyses were 
intended to determine if there were any interactions between the Subscales and the 
Scenarios. These analyses yielded no significant interaction terms. Therefore, I ran a 
second set of analyses with the Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores, Situational 
Tendency Subscale scores, an Interaction Term for the two subscales, and Scenario 
predicting accident judgments. The results of these analyses (including betas, R2, and F 
values) are reported in Table 13.  
Attributional tendencies predicting distribution of perceived causal 
influence. I hypothesized that participants who are more dispositionally focused would 
apportion a greater percent of the perceived cause of the accident to Rick’s driving (rather 
than the other four options: the road and weather conditions, the location of the bus, luck, 
and “other”) than participants who are situationally focused. Similarly, I predicted that 
situationally focused participants will apportion a greater percent of the perceived cause 
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of the accident to the other four factors compared to those who are more dispositionally 
focused. As predicted, with regards to Rick’s driving, there was no effect of the 
Interaction Term (DTSxSTS: β = .03, p = .43). But, the Dispositional Tendency Subscale 
was a significant predictor of perceptions of Rick’s driving such that participants who 
showed more dispositional tendencies attributed a greater percent of the perceived 
causation of the accident to Rick’s driving (DTS: β = .12, p = .01). Further, the 
Situational Tendency Subscale was a marginally significant predictor. Participants who 
showed more situational tendencies attributed a lower percent of the perceived causation 
for the accident to Rick’s driving (STS: β = -.08; p = .09). Scenario was also a significant 
predictor in the regression equation (Scenario: β = -.28, p < .01; R2 (overall model) = .10, 
p < .01). On average, participants who received the Original scenario (M = 46.35, SD = 
26.71) attributed more causation to Rick’s driving than participants who received the 
Ambiguous scenario (M = 30.97, SD = 26.07). 
Next, I ran a series of exploratory regression analyses examining the influence of 
attributional tendencies on causal attributions to the other possible factors. Again, there 
was no effect of the Interaction Term on attributions of causation to the road and weather 
conditions (DTSxSTS: β = -.06, p = .18). However, there was a significant effect of the 
Situational Tendency Subscale. Participants who showed more situational tendencies 
attributed a larger percent of the perceived causation for the accident to the road and 
weather conditions, β = .11, p = .01. However, there was no effect of the Dispositional 
Tendency Subscale for the road and weather conditions, β = -.07, p = .11. But, again 
there was a main effect of Scenario, β = .31, p < .01; R2 (overall model) = .11, p < .01. In 
this case, participants who received the Ambiguous scenario (M = 41.65, SD = 24.46) 
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attributed a higher percentage of the perceived causation of the accident to the road and 
weather conditions than those who received the Original scenario (M = 27.43, SD = 
20.11).  
There was no influence of the Dispositional Tendency Subscale, Situational 
Tendency Subscale, Interaction Term, or Scenario on the percentage of cause attributed 
to the location of the bus (DTS: β = -.04, p = .44; STS: β = -.02, p = .72; DTSxSTS: β = -
.03, p = .56; Scenario: β = .01; p = .81; R2 (overall model) < .01, p = .87), luck (DTS: β < 
-.01, p = .98; STS: β = -.06, p = .23;  DTSxSTS: β = .03, p = .57; Scenario: β < -.01; p = 
.98; R2 (overall model) < .01, p = .72), or “other” (DTS: β = -.02, p = .69; STS: β = -.08, 
p = .09; DTSxSTS: β = .03, p = .50; Scenario: β = .05; p = .25; R2 (overall model) = .01, 
p = .19). 
Attributional tendencies predicting distribution of perceived fault. The next 
question asked participants to assign a percentage of fault to five different possible 
contributing factors. I hypothesized that participants who are more dispositionally 
focused would apportion a greater percent of the perceived fault for the accident to Rick’s 
driving (rather than the other four options: the road and weather conditions, the location 
of the bus, luck, and “other”) than participants who are situationally focused. Similarly, I 
predicted that situationally focused participants will apportion a greater percent of the 
perceived fault for the accident to the other four factors compared to those who are more 
dispositionally focused. A series of regression analyses supported this hypothesis.  
With regards to Rick’s driving, there was no effect of the Interaction Term 
(DTSxSTS: β = .01, p = .92). As predicted, the Dispositional Tendency Subscale was a 
significant predictor for perceptions of Rick’s driving such that participants who showed 
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more dispositional tendencies attributed a greater percent of the perceived fault for the 
accident to Rick’s driving, β = .09, p = .05. The Situational Tendency Subscale, however 
was not a significant predictor for perceived fault for the accident attributed to Rick’s 
driving, β = -.05, p = .27. Similar to perceptions of causation, there was also a main effect 
of Scenario for apportionment of fault, β = -.28, p < .01; R2 (overall model) = .09, p < .01. 
Participants who received the Original scenario (M = 55.00, SD = 29.69) apportioned a 
larger percentage of the perceived fault for the accident to Rick’s driving than 
participants who received the Ambiguous scenario (M = 38.06, SD = 29.88).  
Next, I ran a series of exploratory regression analyses examining the influence of 
attributional tendencies on attributions to the other possible factors. Again, there was no 
effect of the Interaction Term on apportionments of fault to the road and weather 
conditions (DTSxSTS: β = -.02, p = .62). However, there was a significant effect of the 
Situational Tendency Subscale. Participants who showed more situational tendencies 
apportioned a larger percent of the perceived fault for the accident to the road and 
weather conditions, β = .11, p = .01. However, there was only a marginally significant 
effect of the Dispositional Tendency Subscale, such that participants who showed more 
dispositional tendencies apportioned a lower percent of the perceived fault for the 
accident to the road and weather conditions, β = -.09, p = .06. Again, there was also a 
main effect of Scenario, β = .35, p < .01; R2 (overall model) = .14, p < .01. In this case, 
Participants who received the Ambiguous scenario (M = 36.38, SD = 26.55) apportioned 
a large percentage of the perceived fault for the accident to the road and weather 
conditions than participants who received the Original scenario (M = 19.50, SD = 20.26).  
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There was no influence of the Dispositional Tendency Subscale, Situational 
Tendency Subscale, Interaction Term, or Scenario on the percentage of fault attributed to 
the location of the bus (DTS: β = -.03, p = .52; STS: β = -.04, p = .46; DTSxSTS: β = -
.03, p = .48; Scenario: β = .05; p = .66; R2 (overall model) < .01, p = .78), luck (DTS: β = 
-.08, p = .09; STS: β = -.08, p = .08; DTSxSTS: β = .02, p = .65; Scenario: β = -.03; p = 
.50; R2 (overall model) = .02, p = .07), or “other” (DTS: β = -.02, p = .73; STS: β = -.07, 
p = .17; DTSxSTS: β = .06, p = .19; Scenario: β = .07; p = .11; R2 (overall model) = .02, 
p = .11). 
Attributional tendencies predicting distribution of perceived responsibility. 
The next question asked participants to assign a percentage of responsibility to five 
different possible contributing factors. I hypothesized that participants who are more 
dispositionally focused would apportion a greater percent of the perceived responsibility 
for the accident to Rick’s driving (rather than the other four options: the road and weather 
conditions, the location of the bus, luck, and “other”) than participants who are 
situationally focused. Similarly, I predicted that situationally focused participants will 
apportion a greater percent of the perceived responsibility for the accident to the other 
four factors compared to those who are more dispositionally focused. A series of 
regression analyses supported this hypothesis.  
With regards to Rick’s driving, there was no effect of the Interaction Term 
(DTSxSTS: β = .01, p = .76). As predicted, the Dispositional Tendency Subscale was a 
significant predictor for perceptions of Rick’s driving such that participants who showed 
more dispositional tendencies attributed a greater percent of the perceived responsibility 
for the accident to Rick’s driving, β = .12, p = .01. The Situational Tendency Subscale 
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was a marginally significant predictor. Participants who showed more situational 
tendencies attributed a smaller percent of the perceived responsibility for the accident to 
Rick’s driving, β = -.09, p = .06.  There was a main effect of Scenario, β = -.23, p < .01; 
R2 (overall model) = .07, p < .01. Participants who received the Original scenario (M = 
57.32, SD = 30.79) apportioned a larger percentage of the perceived responsibility for the 
accident to Rick’s driving than participants who received the Ambiguous scenario (M = 
42.63, SD = 32.73).  
Next, I ran a series of exploratory regression analyses examining the influence of 
attributional tendencies on attributions to the other possible factors. Again, there was no 
effect of the Interaction Term on apportionments of fault to the road and weather 
conditions (DTSxSTS: β = -.03, p = .56). However, for the road and weather conditions 
there was a marginally significant effect of the Dispositional Tendency Subscale. 
Participants who showed more dispositional tendencies attributed a smaller percent of the 
perceived responsibility for the accident to the road and weather conditions, β = -.08, p = 
.07. There was also only a marginally significant effect of the Situational Tendency 
Subscale, such that participants who showed more situational tendencies attributed a 
greater percent of the perceived responsibility for the accident to the road and weather 
conditions, β = .09, p = .06. Again, there was a main effect of Scenario, β = .32, p < .01; 
R2 (overall model) = .12, p < .01. In this case, Participants who received the Ambiguous 
scenario (M = 31.74, SD = 28.19) apportioned a large percentage of the perceived 
responsibility for the accident to the road and weather conditions than participants who 
received the Original scenario (M = 15.57, SD = 19.35). 
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There was no influence of the Dispositional Tendency Subscale, Situational 
Tendency Subscale, Interaction Term, or Scenario on the percentage of responsibility 
attributed to the location of the bus (DTS: β = -.04, p = .44; STS: β = .06, p = .25; 
DTSxSTS: β = -.03, p = .49; Scenario: β = -.01; p = .87; R2 (overall model) < .01, p = 
.72), luck (DTS: β = -.08, p = .10; STS: β = -.08, p = .10; DTSxSTS: β = .03, p = .49; 
Scenario: β = -.03; p = .47; R2 (overall model) = .02, p = .06), or “other” (DTS: β = -.07, 
p = .15; STS: β = -.04, p = .37; DTSxSTS: β = .05, p = .26; Scenario: β = .09; p = .06; R2 
(overall model) = .02, p = .04). 
Attributional tendencies predicting perceived legal responsibility. I also 
predicted that individuals who are dispositionally focused are more likely to agree that 
Rick should be held legally responsible for hitting the bus than individuals who are 
situationally focused. The regression analysis failed to support this hypothesis. First, 
there was no effect of the Interaction Term (DTSxSTS: β = -.02, p = .68). The results 
indicated that neither the Dispositional Tendency Subscale nor the Situational Tendency 
Subscale predicted perceiving Rick as legally responsible for the accident (DTS: β = .07, 
p = .12; STS: β = -.01, p = .76). However, Scenario was a significant predictor, β = -.21, 
p < .01; R2 (overall model) = .05, p < .01. Unsurprisingly, participants who received the 
Original scenario (M = 5.34, SD = 1.33) agreed more with the statement that Rick should 
be held legally responsible for the accident than participants who received the 
Ambiguous scenario (M = 4.75, SD = 1.44). 
Attributional tendencies predicting perceived blameworthiness. I also 
predicted that individuals who are dispositionally focused are more likely to agree that 
Rick is blameworthy for hitting the bus than individuals who are situationally focused. 
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The regression analysis supported this hypothesis. First, there was no effect of the 
Interaction Term (DTSxSTS: β = .04, p = .40). The results indicated that the 
Dispositional Tendency Subscale predicted perceiving Rick as blameworthy for the 
accident such that the more dispositionally focused participants perceived Rick as more 
blameworthy, β = .19, p <.01. However, the Situational Tendency Subscale was not a 
significant predictor, β = -.07, p = .14. Once again, Scenario was a significant predictor, β 
= -.19, p < .01; R2 (overall model) = .07, p < .01. Participants who received the Original 
scenario (M = 4.85, SD = 1.42) agreed more with the statement that Rick is blameworthy 
for the accident than participants who received the Ambiguous scenario (M = 4.26, SD = 
1.52). 
Attributional tendencies predicting perceived inappropriateness of Rick’s 
actions. With the addition of a second, ambiguous scenario, I added a question regarding 
the appropriateness of Rick’s actions. The original scenario explicitly stated that Rick 
was speeding. However, this piece of information was removed from the second scenario. 
Thus, I predicted that there should be a main effect of scenario such that Rick’s actions 
are seen as more inappropriate in the original scenario where it explicitly states that Rick 
is speeding. However, there should be no effect of attributional tendencies on perceptions 
of the appropriateness of Rick’s behavior. The regression analysis supported this 
hypothesis. First, as with the other analyses, there was no effect of the Interaction Term 
(DTSxSTS: β = .04, p = .40). Further, the results indicated that neither the Dispositional 
Tendency Subscale nor the Situational Tendency Subscale predicted perceiving Rick’s 
actions as inappropriate (DTS: β = .05, p = .23; STS: β = -.02, p = .72). However, 
Scenario was a significant predictor, β = -.40, p < .01; R2 (overall model) = .17, p < .01. 
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Participants who received the Original scenario (M = 5.14, SD = 1.44) agreed more with 
the statement that Rick’s actions were inappropriate than participants who received the 
Ambiguous scenario (M = 3.90, SD = 1.38). 
Attributional tendencies predicting amount of damages Rick should pay. I 
also predicted that individuals who are dispositionally focused are going to find that Rick 
should pay a higher percent of the damages than individuals who are situationally 
focused. Again, the regression analysis supported this hypothesis. First, as with the other 
analyses, there was no effect of the Interaction Term (DTSxSTS: β = -.06, p = .20). The 
results indicated that the Dispositional Tendency Subscale had a marginally significant 
effect on how much of the damages Rick should have to pay. Participants who were more 
dispositionally focused required Rick to pay a higher amount of the damages, β = .09, p = 
.06. But, the Situational Tendency Subscale was not a significant predictor, β = -.06; p = 
.17. Scenario was also a significant predictor, β = -.24, p < .01; R2 (overall model) = .07, 
p < .01. Participants who received the Original scenario (M = 58,512.16, SD = 31,491.58) 
requested that Rick pay a higher proportion of the damages than participants who 
received the Ambiguous scenario (M = 42,470.33, SD = 32,153.59). 
Attributional tendencies predicting perceived negligence. Following the logic 
laid out in Study 1, I hypothesized that dispositionally focused individuals are less likely 
to find that Rick’s actions were negligent. I ran a logistic regression analysis with the 
Dispositional Tendency Subscale, Situational Tendency Subscale, the Interaction Term, 
and Scenario as predictors. Again, the results indicated that the Dispositional Tendency 
Subscale, Situational Tendency Subscale, and Interaction Term were not significant 
predictors (DTS: B = -.16, p = .22; STS: B = .01, p = .93; DTSxSTS: B = .06, p = .56). 
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However, Scenario was a significant predictor (B = 1.30, p < .01; Nagelkerke R2 (overall 
model) = .11). Thus, perceptions of whether Rick’s actions were negligent were not 
influenced by the participants’ attributional tendencies, but they were influenced by the 
Scenario. 
Cultural and Demographic Group Affiliation Predicting Attributional Tendencies 
One of the primary objectives of Study 2 was to examine the relationship between 
cultural and demographic group affiliation and attributional tendencies, specifically 
focusing on cultural differences based on ethnicity. To examine these relationships I ran a 
series of analyses in which group affiliation predicted Dispositional Tendency Subscale 
scores and Situational Tendency Subscale scores. Like Study 1, I also ran a series of 
analyses utilizing the difference score between the Dispositional Tendency Subscale 
scores and Situational Tendency Subscale scores as the outcome variable. To compute 
this Difference Score, I subtracted the Situational Tendency Subscale Scores from the 
Dispositional Tendency Subscale score. Based on the literature, I predicted that those 
who are primarily socialized in Western cultures, men, those from higher social classes, 
and those who are younger will be more dispositionally focused and less situationally 
focused than those who are primarily socialized in Eastern cultures, women, those from 
lower social classes, and those who are older.  
Cultural differences based on ethnic group. First, I examined the influence of 
cultural differences based on ethnic group affiliation on the Dispositional and Situational 
Tendency Subscale scores. According to the literature, Asians should be more 
situationally focused and less dispositionally focused than Caucasians. To examine this 
effect I created two groups for comparison. The Asian group consisted of the participants 
  73 
who selected East Asian, Southeast Asian, South Asian, and Asian American for their 
ethnicity (n = 126). The Caucasian group consisted of the participants who selected 
White/Caucasian/European American for their ethnicity (n = 250). Means and Standard 
Deviations for these participants are reported in Table 14. 
I ran a series of one-way ANOVAs. Contrary to predictions, there was no 
difference in the Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores (F (1, 377) = 1.45, p = .23; 
Caucasian: M = 4.93, SD = .82; Asian: M = 5.04, SD = .86) or in the Situational 
Tendency Subscale scores (F (1, 374) = .53, p = .47; Caucasian: M = 5.20, SD = .86; 
Asian: M = 5.26, SD = .86) based on cultural group affiliation. There was also no 
observed ethnic difference between Asian and Caucasian participants for the Difference 
score (F (1, 374) = .09, p = .77; Caucasian: M = -.26, SD = 1.10; Asian: M = -.23, SD = 
.89). 
I also ran a series of exploratory One-way ANOVAs with the Situationism Scale 
and Grossmann and Varnum’s Dispositionism and Situationism Measures as the 
dependent variables. Again, there was also no observed ethnic difference between Asian 
and Caucasian participants for the Situationism Scale (F (1, 368) < .01, p = .98; 
Caucasian: M = 4.87  SD = .58; Asian: M = 4.87, SD = .57), Grossmann and Varnum’s 
Dispositionism Measure (F (1, 376) = .29, p = .59; Caucasian: M = 4.77  SD = .89; Asian: 
M = 4.83, SD = .89), or Grossmann and Varnum’s Situationism Measure (F (1, 376) = 
.03, p = .86; Caucasian: M = 5.22  SD = .75; Asian: M = 5.24, SD = .92). 
Previous research findings also suggest that Hispanic cultures are more 
situationally focused and less dispositionally focused than Western cultures. Because 
14.9% of the sample indicated that they were “Hispanic/Latino,” I ran a series of one-way 
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ANOVAs to explore whether there were any observed attributional differences between 
the Hispanic and Caucasian participants. Contrary to predictions, there was no difference 
in the Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores (F (1, 329) < .01, p = .98; Caucasian: M = 
4.93, SD = .82; Hispanic: M = 4.93, SD = .94) or in the Situational Tendency Subscale 
scores (F (1, 328) = 1.86, p = .17; Caucasian: M = 5.20, SD = .86; Hispanic: M = 5.34, 
SD = .74) based on cultural group affiliation. There was also no observed ethnic 
difference between Hispanic and Caucasian participants for the Difference score (F (1, 
327) = 1.21, p = .27; Caucasian: M = -.26, SD = 1.10; Hispanic: M = -.41, SD = .84). 
I also ran a series of exploratory one-way ANOVAs with the Situationism Scale, 
and Grossmann and Varnum’s Dispositionism and Situationism Measures as the 
dependent variables. Again, there was also no observed ethnic difference between 
Hispanic and Caucasian participants for the Situationism Scale (F (1, 324) = 2.17, p = 
.14; Caucasian: M = 4.87  SD = .58; Hispanic: M = 4.76, SD = .62), Grossmann and 
Varnum’s Dispositionism Measure (F (1, 328) = .05, p = .82; Caucasian: M = 4.77  SD = 
.89; Hispanic: M = 4.75, SD = .90), or Grossmann and Varnum’s Situationism Measure 
(F (1, 329) = 1.82, p = .18; Caucasian: M = 5.22  SD = .75; Hispanic: M = 5.35, SD = 
.81). 
Men vs. women. I predicted that men and women would differ in their 
attributional tendencies, such that men would be more dispositionally focused than 
women. To test this hypothesis, I ran a series of one-way ANOVAs. Means and Standard 
Deviations for these participants are reported in Table 15. Contrary to the hypothesis, 
there was no difference in the Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores (F (1, 490) < .01, 
p = .96; Men: M = 4.96, SD = .90; Women: M = 4.96, SD = .83) or in the Situational 
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Tendency Subscale scores (F (1, 488) = .81, p = .37; Men: M = 5.22, SD = .88; Women: 
M = 5.29, SD = .77) based on gender. Like in Study 1, there was also no observed gender 
difference for the Difference score (F (1, 487) = .60, p = .44; Men: M = -.26, SD = 1.05; 
Women: M = -.33, SD = .96). 
I also ran a series of exploratory One-way ANOVAs with the Situationism Scale, 
and Grossmann and Varnum’s Dispositionism and Situationism Measures as the 
dependent variables. Again, there was also no observed gender difference for the 
Situationism Scale (F (1, 482) = .42, p = .52; Men: M = 4.85, SD = .60; Women: M = 
4.82, SD = .57) or Grossmann and Varnum’s Dispositionism Measure (F (1, 488) < .01, p 
> .99; Men: M = 4.78, SD = .89; Women: M = 4.78, SD = .88). However, there was an 
observed gender difference for Grossmann and Varnum’s Situationism Measure (F (1, 
489) = 5.46, p = .02). Men had lower situationism scores (M = 5.16, SD = .88) than 
women (M = 5.33, SD = .77). 
Socioeconomic Status. I also hypothesized that socioeconomic status influences 
attributional tendencies such that higher socioeconomic status individuals are more 
dispositionally focused. To compute a measure of socioeconomic status, a composite 
score was created using the z-scores of four different socioeconomic status measures 
(Chronbach’s alpha = .76). The correlations for the four socioeconomic status measures 
and the composite measure are reported in Table 16. First, I ran two separate regression 
analyses with the socioeconomic status composite score predicting Dispositional 
Tendency Subscale scores and Situational Tendency Subscale scores. There was no 
difference in the Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores (β < -.01, R2 (overall model) < 
.01, p = .89) or in the Situational Tendency Subscale scores (β = -.03, R2 (overall model) 
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<.01, p = .58) based on socioeconomic status. Next, I ran a regression analysis with the 
socioeconomic status composite score predicting the Difference score. Again, contrary to 
the hypothesis, there was no influence of socioeconomic status on the Difference scores 
(β = .02, R2 (overall model) < .01, p = .74).  
I also ran a series of exploratory regression analyses with the Socioeconomic 
Status Composite as the predictor and the Situationism Scale and Grossmann and 
Varnum’s Dispositionism and Situationism Measures as the outcome variables. There 
was an observed effect of socioeconomic status for the Situationism Scale, such that 
higher socioeconomic status was associated with higher scores on the Situationism Scale 
(β = .11, R2 (overall model) = .01, p = .02). But there was not a significant effect for 
Grossmann and Varnum’s Dispositionism Measure (β = .01, R2 (overall model) < .01, p = 
.81) or Grossmann and Varnum’s Situationism Measure (β = -.02, R2 (overall model) < 
.01, p = .74). 
Age. Finally, the literature also suggests that attributional tendencies may vary 
based on age. Although there is some evidence that older Americans are more 
dispositional, the stronger evidence suggests that older Americans are more situationally 
focused than younger Americans. Because this was a student sample, I began my 
analyses by examining the age distribution of my participants. In total, 98.2% of my 
participants were between the ages of 18 and 25 which created a very limited range of 
age. Thus, I was unable to test any hypotheses regarding the influence of age with this 
sample. 
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Cultural and Demographic Group Affiliation Predicting Accident Judgments 
Like Study 1, to examine the direct relationship between cultural and 
demographic group affiliation and the accident judgments, I ran a series of analyses in 
which group affiliation predicted the accident judgments. Based on the literature, I 
predicted that those who are primarily socialized in Western cultures, men, those from 
higher social classes, and those who are younger would attribute more causal influence to 
Rick, apportion a large percentage of perceived responsibility to Rick, perceive Rick as 
more legally responsible, and request that Rick pay a higher proportion of the damages.  
Cultural difference based on ethnic group. To test the cultural differences 
based on ethnic group hypothesis, I ran a series of ANOVAs examining the differences 
between Caucasian and Asian participants on the accident judgments. The results, along 
with the group means and standard deviations, are reported in Table 17. Contrary to my 
hypotheses, there were no cultural differences based on ethnic group observed for 
attributions of causal influence to Rick, apportionments of percentage of perceived fault 
to Rick, or apportionments of percentage of perceived responsibility to Rick (see Table 
17). However, there were differences observed between Caucasians and Asians for 
perceiving Rick as more legally responsible, and requesting that Rick pay a higher 
proportion of the damages. Caucasian participants (M = 5.21, SD = 1.33) were more 
likely to agree with the statement that Rick should be held legally responsible for the 
accident than Asian participants (M = 4.88, SD = 1.42), F (1, 377) = 4.91, p = .03. 
Similarly, Caucasian participants (M = 54,193.45, SD = 34,187.75) believed that Rick 
should pay a higher proportion of the damages amount than Asian participants (M = 
45,270.33, SD = 28,668.91), F (1, 376) = 6.35, p = .01.  
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In addition, there were a couple of significant exploratory analyses. When 
apportioning fault, Asian participants (M = 4.31, SD = 9.95) apportioned more fault than 
Caucasian participants to luck (F (1, 374) = 8.76, p < .01; Asian: M = 4.31, SD = 9.95; 
Caucasian: M = 1.95, SD = 5.50) and other factors (F (1, 377) = 10.95, p < .01; Asian: M 
= 2.93, SD = 6.00; Caucasian: M = 1.22, SD = 3.99). 
Men vs. women. To test my gender hypothesis, I ran a series of ANOVAs 
examining the differences between men and women on accident judgments. The results, 
along with the group means and standard deviations, are reported in Table 18. Contrary to 
my hypotheses, there were no gender differences observed for attributions of causal 
influence to Rick, apportionments of the percentage of perceived fault to Rick, 
apportionments of the percentage of perceived responsibility to Rick, perceiving Rick as 
more legally responsible, and requesting that Rick pay a higher proportion of the 
damages (see Table 18).  
However, there were a few significant exploratory analyses. First, there was a 
marginally significant effect indicating that women (M = 37.17, SD = 23.52) attributed 
more causal influence to the road and weather conditions than men (M = 31.28, SD = 
22.98), F (1, 491) = 7.87, p = .01. Second, women attributed significantly less causal 
influence to luck (F (1, 489) = 7.71, p = .01; Women: M = 3.27, SD = 6.05; Men: M = 
5.28, SD = 9.76) and other factors (F (1, 488) = 7.61, p = .01; Women: M = 1.75, SD = 
5.43; Men: M = 3.35, SD = 7.31) than men. These findings were consistent with Study 1.  
Similar results were found for apportionment of fault and responsibility. With 
regards to perceived fault, women (M = 30.27, SD = 24.92) apportioned more fault to the 
road and weather conditions than men (M = 21.09, SD = 19.28), F (1, 487) = 5.58, p = 
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.02. In contrast, Women apportioned less fault to luck (F (1, 487) = 14.66, p < .01; 
Women: M = 1.33, SD = 4.09; Men: M = 3.73, SD = 9.13) and other factors (F (1, 491) = 
5.56, p = .02; Women: M = 1.20, SD = 3.71; Men: M = 2.23, SD = 5.86) than men.  
Finally, women (M = 25.89, SD = 25.92) also apportioned more responsibility to 
the road and weather conditions than men (M = 20.79, SD = 24.54), F (1, 490) = 4.99, p = 
.03. Similarly, women also apportioned less responsibility to luck than men. (F (1, 489) = 
8.67, p < .01; Women: M = 1.50, SD = 5.70; Men: M = 3.60, SD = 9.75). Again, these 
findings are consistent with those in Study 1.  
Socioeconomic status. I tested the socioeconomic hypothesis using a series of 
regression analyses in which the Socioeconomic Status Composite score predicted the 
accident judgments. The results of these analyses (including betas, R2, and F values) are 
reported in Table 19. Contrary to my hypotheses, there were no effects of socioeconomic 
status observed for attributions of causal influence to Rick, apportionments of the 
percentage of perceived fault to Rick, apportionments of the percentage of perceived 
responsibility to Rick, perceiving Rick as more legally responsible, and requesting that 
Rick pay a higher proportion of the damages (see Table 19).  
However, there were a few significant exploratory analyses. There was a 
marginally significant effect indicating that higher socioeconomic status participants 
were less likely to attribute causal influence to the road and weather conditions, β = -.09, 
R2 (overall model) = .01, p = .06. Similarly, higher socioeconomic status participants 
apportioned less fault (β = -.10, R2 (overall model) = .01, p = .02) and less responsibility 
(β = -.10, R2 (overall model) = .01, p = .03) to the road and weather conditions compared 
to the lower socioeconomic status participants. There was also a marginally significant 
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effect of socioeconomic status on apportioning fault to other factors, β = -.08, R2 (overall 
model) = .01, p = .07. Higher socioeconomic status participants apportioned less fault to 
other factors than lower socioeconomic status participants. 
Study 2 Discussion 
The results of Study 2 largely confirm and extend the findings of Study 1. Like 
Study 1, the factor structure of the Attributional Tendency Scale suggests that 
dispositional tendencies and situational tendencies are distinct concepts loading on two 
separate factors. Study 2 expands these findings by examining the convergent and 
divergent validity of the scale. As predicted, the Dispositional Tendency Subscale is 
positively correlated with Grossmann and Varnum’s Dispositionism Measure, and the 
Situational Tendency Subscale is positively correlated with the Situationism Scale and 
Grossmann and Varnum’s Situationism Measure. This established convergent validity. 
Also as predicted, the Dispositional Tendency and Situational Tendency Subscales were 
uncorrelated with Rotter’s Locus of Control scale establishing divergent validity. 
Like Study 1 and as predicted, apportionments of causation, fault, and 
responsibility to Rick’s driving were influenced by attributional tendencies. Participants 
who were more dispositionally focused and less situationally focused apportioned more 
causation, fault, and responsibility to Rick’s driving. However, unlike Study 1 there was 
no influence of either dispositional tendencies or situational tendencies on perceptions of 
Rick’s legal responsibility. However, there was a marginal effect that those who were 
more dispositionally focused believed that Rick should pay less in damages.  
Contrary to my predictions, cultural and demographic group affiliation—based on 
ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status—did not predict Dispositional Tendency 
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Subscale and Situational Tendency Subscale scores. Further, ethnicity failed to predict 
differences in attributions of causal influence to Rick and apportionments of percentage 
of perceived fault and responsibility to Rick. However, Caucasian participants were more 
likely to agree that Rick should be held legally responsible for the accident compared to 
Asian participants. Similarly, Caucasian participants believed that Rick should pay a 
higher proportion of the damages amount than Asian Participants. But, like Study 1, there 
were no gender differences or effects of socioeconomic status observed for attributions of 
causal influence to Rick, apportionments of the percentage of perceived fault to Rick, 
apportionments of the percentage of perceived responsibility to Rick, agreement that Rick 
should be held legally responsible, and requesting that Rick pay a higher proportion of 
the damages. 
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STUDY 3 
Traditionally, cultural differences—such as attributional tendencies—have 
been viewed as stable over extended periods of time and resistant to change (see 
Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Moore & Lewis, 1952; White, 1947). But, recent work on 
extracultural cognition indicates that immediate cultural contexts exert powerful 
influences on cognition and behavioral patterns, and cultural differences in cognition 
can be malleable (Votruba & Kwan, in press). For example, Gardner, Gabriel, and Lee 
(1999) induced Western and East Asian participants to adopt independent or 
interdependent mindsets by having participants read a passage and circle words like I or 
me (to prime independence) and words like us or we (to prime interdependence).  They 
found that participants tended to endorse individualistic values when primed with 
independence, and collectivistic values when primed with interdependence.  
Another study by Spencer-Rodgers and colleagues (2004) primed dialectical 
thinking by asking both European American and Chinese participants to think about 
and describe ambivalent experiences that had both positive and negative consequences 
for the self. They found that both the European Americans and the Chinese in the prime 
condition scored higher on dialecticism than those in the control condition. Taking this 
premise a step further, Alter and Kwan (2009) demonstrated that dialectical thinking 
could be activated using culturally-laden stimuli and physical environments that 
brought to mind the cognitive style, without having to directly prime the cultural 
concepts per se. In a series of studies examining extracultural dialectical cognition, 
Alter and Kwan showed that the immediate physical environment and exposure to 
cultural symbols could induce European Americans to think more dialectically. 
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Although yet unexplored, it may be possible to manipulate individuals 
culturally derived attributional tendencies such that individuals from dispositionally 
focused cultures may be induced to think more situational and vice versa. Study 3 will 
explore this possibility by providing a sample of American participants with the same 
car accident scenario used in Study 1 after having primed participants with a 
situationally focused prime or a dispositionally focused prime. The prime will take the 
form of a newspaper article reporting on new scientific findings that support the idea of 
Dispositionism or Situationism. Within the article, expert scientists are directly quoted. 
This is done to approximate the type of testimony that an expert witness could provide 
on this issue during a trial. Participants will then be asked the same questions about the 
accident as in Study 2.  
Methods 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the Psychology 101 subject pool at Arizona State 
University. Participants in this subject pool are awarded research participation credit for 
their Psychology 101 course in exchange for completing the study (0.5 credits for this 
study). In total, 353 participants completed this study (average age was 19.49). Of the 
participants, 55.5% reported they were female and 42.2% reported they were male (2.3% 
chose not to report their gender).  The ethnic breakdown of the participants consisted of: 
70.5% White/Caucasian; 4.2% Black/African-American; 17.8% Hispanic/Latino; 1.1% 
Native American; 1.7% Middle Eastern/Arab/Arab American; 0.3% European or 
Australian; and 2.0% chose the “other” category (2.3% of participants did not indicate an 
ethnicity). It should be noted that there were no Asian participants in this study. Study 3 
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was run concurrently with Study 2 and all Asian participants were directed to Study 2 to 
increase the cultural diversity of that study.  
Similar to Study 2, this study included a catch questions to detect random 
responding. Around the middle of the study, hidden in a matrix of questions asking 
participants to indicate their agreement with scale items, participants were told “If you 
are reading this statement, please select Disagree.” Participants who failed to select 
“Disagree” were removed from the sample prior to data analysis. Three hundred and 
thirty-one participants (93.8%) responded with “disagree” to this item and their data is 
reported in the methods section.  
Design 
This study will consist of a one-factor between-subjects design manipulating the 
attributional prime. The independent variable is whether the participant receives the 
dispositionism or situationism prime. The dependent variables consist of the same 
accident judgments assessed in Study 2. This study also included the Attributional 
Tendency Scale as a manipulation check for the primes.  
Materials and Procedures 
This study was administered online through Sona Systems using Qualtrics survey 
software. Participants began the study by reading either a dispositionism or situationism 
prime (see Appendix C). This is a newly developed priming technique for this study. The 
directions for the prime stated: “This first study examines short term memory for 
narrative information. Please take a few minutes to carefully read a section of a recent 
Op-Ed article from the New York Times. You will later be asked to recall details of the 
article during a memory task.” These directions were intended to encourage the 
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participants to carefully read the article. Then the participants were provided the 
dispositional or situational prime.  
After reading the prime, participants were directed to participate in what they are 
told is an unrelated study (as a distractor task) before the memory test can be 
administered. They then read the same scenario used in Study 1 (the Original version of 
the scenario). Following the scenario, participants were asked the same accident 
judgment questions that were presented in Study 2. Then, participants were given the 
Attributional Tendency Scale as a manipulation check for the primes. Following the 
scales, participants answered demographic questions including questions about their age, 
gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, citizenship, political affiliation, and religion. 
Participants were then debriefed and redirected to a separate page that automatically 
provided research credit for their participation in the study. 
Results 
I predict that compared to participants who receive the situational prime, 
participants who receive the dispositional prime are: (1) more dispositionally focused; (2) 
less likely to attribute some portion of the cause of the harm to other actors; (3) more 
likely to hold the defendant responsible for the harm; (4) more likely to find the 
defendant liable; and (5) more likely to hold the defendant financially responsible for a 
greater amount. To test these predictions, I performed a series of one-way ANOVAs.  
Manipulation Check: Attributional Tendency Scale Scores 
The Attributional Tendency Scale was included in this study as a manipulation 
check. If the primes had the desired effect, then participants who received the 
Dispositional Prime should be more dispositionally focused than those who received the 
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Situational Prime. The six-item two-subscale version of the Attributional Tendency Scale 
computed for Study 1 and Study 2 was also used in this study. The Dispositional 
Tendency Subscale (Chronbach’s alpha = .56) and Situational Tendency Subscale 
(Chronbach’s alpha = .66) were significantly negatively correlated, r (327) = -.14, p = 
.01. This is in contrast with the previous studies in which the two subscales were 
significantly positively correlated. The correlations, means, and standard deviations for 
the Dispositional Tendency Subscale, Situational Tendency Subscale, Situationism Scale 
(Chronbach’s alpha = .73), and Grossmann & Varnum’s Dispositionism (Chronbach’s 
alpha = .83) and Situationism (Chronbach’s alpha = .74) Measures are reported in Table 
20.   
I ran a one-way ANOVA to perform the manipulation check. The means and 
standard deviations of the scale scores for each of the primes are reported in Table 21. As 
predicted, there was significant difference in Dispositional Tendency Subscale scores 
based on Prime, F (1, 325) = 27.94, p < .01. Participants who received the Dispositional 
Prime scored higher on the Dispositional Tendency Subscale (M = 5.16, SD = .79) than 
those who received the Situational Prime (M = 4.65, SD = .91). There was also a 
significant difference in Situational Tendency Subscale scores based on Prime, F (1, 329) 
= 18.25, p < .01. Participants who received the Dispositional Prime scored lower on the 
Situational Tendency Subscale (M = 5.02, SD = .90) than those who received the 
Situational Prime (M = 5.42, SD = .77). 
The Influence of Prime (Dispositional vs. Situational) on Accident Judgments 
To test my predictions regarding the influence of the Dispositional and Situational 
Primes on accident judgments, I ran a series of one-way ANOVAs. The results are 
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reported along with the means and standard deviations in Table 14. In addition, overall 
means for the accident judgments are reported in Table 22.  
Influence of Prime on distributions of perceived causal influence. I 
hypothesized that participants who received the Dispositional Prime would apportion a 
greater percent of the perceived cause of the accident to Rick’s driving (rather than the 
other four options: the road and weather conditions, the location of the bus, luck, and 
“other”) than participants who received the Situational Prime. Contrary to my 
predictions, there was no influence of Prime on attributions of causal influence to Rick’s 
driving (F (1, 329) < .01, p = .99), the road and weather conditions (F (1, 329) = .10, p = 
.76), the location of the bus (F (1, 329) = .16, p = .69), other “other” (F (1, 325) = .29, p 
= .59). There was, however, an influence of Prime on attributions of causal influence to 
luck (F (1, 327) = 4.80, p = .03) such that participants who received the Dispositional 
Prime attributed more causal influence to luck (M = 4.93, SD = 8.64) than those who 
received the Situational Prime (M = 3.16, SD = 5.97). 
Influence of Prime on distributions of perceived fault. I hypothesized that 
participants who received the Dispositional Prime would apportion a greater percent of 
the perceived fault for the accident to Rick’s driving (rather than the other four options: 
the road and weather conditions, the location of the bus, luck, and “other”) than 
participants who received the Situational Prime. Contrary to my predictions, there was no 
influence of Prime on distributions of perceptions of fault to Rick’s driving (F (1, 329) = 
.18, p = .68), the road and weather conditions (F (1, 329) = .14, p = .71), the location of 
the bus (F (1, 328) = 3.01, p = .08), luck (F (1, 329) = .06, p = .80), or “other” (F (1, 329) 
= 1.23, p = .27).  
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Influence of Prime on distributions of perceived responsibility. I hypothesized 
that participants who received the Dispositional Prime would apportion a greater percent 
of the perceived responsibility for the accident to Rick’s driving (rather than the other 
four options: the road and weather conditions, the location of the bus, luck, and “other”) 
than participants who receive the Situational Prime. Contrary to my predictions, there 
was no influence of Prime on distributions of perceived responsibility to Rick’s driving 
(F (1, 328) = 1.20, p = .28), the road and weather conditions (F (1, 327) = .03, p = .86), 
luck (F (1, 329) = .33, p = .57), or “other” (F (1, 329) = .09, p = .76). There was, 
however, an influence of Prime on distributions of perceived responsibility to the bus 
location (F (1, 328) = 4.59, p = .03) such that participants who received the Dispositional 
Prime proportioned more perceived responsibility to the location of the bus (M = 25.47, 
SD = 24.33) than those who received the Situational Prime (M = 20.38, SD = 18.84). 
Influence of Prime on perceived legal responsibility. I hypothesized that 
participants who received the Dispositional Prime would show greater agreement that 
Rick should be held legally responsible for the accident. Contrary to my predictions, 
there was no influence of Prime on agreement that Rick should be held legally 
responsible for the accident, F (1, 329) = .98, p = .32.  
Influence of Prime on perceived blameworthiness of Rick. I hypothesized that 
participants who received the Dispositional Prime would show greater agreement that 
Rick was blameworthy for the accident.  Contrary to my predictions, there was no 
influence of Prime on agreement that Rick was blameworthy for the accident, F (1, 327) 
<.01, p = .99.  
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Influence of Prime on amount of damages Rick should pay. I hypothesized 
that participants who received the Dispositional Prime would believe that Rick should 
pay a greater proportion of the damages from the accident.  Contrary to my predictions, 
there was no influence of Prime on participant’s belief that Rick should pay a greater 
proportion of the damages, F (1, 329) = .08 p = .78.  
Study 3 Discussion 
Study 3 diverges from the other studies by attempting to manipulate attributional 
tendencies to observe its effect on accident judgments. The primes manipulating 
attributional tendencies had the desired effect on the Dispositional Tendency and 
Situational Tendency Subscales. Participants who received the dispositional prime scored 
higher on the Dispositional Tendency Subscale than those who received the situational 
prime. Similarly, those who received the situational prime scored higher on the 
Situational Tendency Subscale than those who received the dispositional prime.  
 In contrast to my predictions, the attributional manipulation had no effect on 
accident judgments. There was no difference between the primes on attributions of causal 
influence to Rick, apportionments of percentage of perceived fault to Rick, 
apportionments of percentage of perceived responsibility to Rick, agreement that Rick 
should be held legally responsible, and requesting that Rick pay a higher proportion of 
the damages. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Overall, the findings from these studies show mixed support for my hypotheses. 
Study 1 and Study 2 found that attributional tendencies influenced accident judgments as 
predicted. But, these studies largely failed to establish a link between the cultural and 
demographic group affiliations and attributional tendencies. In addition, cultural and 
demographic group affiliations did not predict accident judgments. Study 3 examined the 
influence of manipulating attributional tendencies on accident judgments. In this study, 
the manipulation check indicated that the dispositional and situational primes had the 
desired effect on the Dispositional Tendency Subscale and Situational Tendency Subscale 
scores. But, there was no effect of the dispositional and situational manipulations on 
accident judgments. 
 The development of the Attributional Tendency Scale for these studies advances 
our understanding of attributional theory and cultural differences in attributions. As 
previously noted, the attributional tendency literature often discusses dispositional and 
situational attributions as though they are unidimensional. In other words, two ends of a 
continuum. But, the factor structures that emerged in the exploratory factor analyses of 
Studies 1 and 2 and the confirmatory factor analyses support treating dispositional and 
situational attributional tendencies as separate components or factors. Further, the 
Dispositional Tendency Subscale and Situational Tendency Subscale were positively 
correlated in Study 1 and Study 2. This suggests that participants can be high on both 
dispositional and situational attributional tendencies (sometimes referred to as 
interactionism in the literature). This further supports treating dispositional and 
situational tendencies as unique concepts. Future research could explore the implications 
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of the relationship between dispositional and situational tendencies on judgment and 
decision-making. For example, are the social perceptions of someone who is high on both 
dispositional and situational tendencies (or low on both) different than someone who is 
high on one and low on the other? 
 These studies are also some of the first to explore the implications of attributional 
tendencies for judgment and decision-making in a negligent tort context. Most of the 
research examining cultural and demographic differences in attributional tendencies stops 
at examining and documenting differences in social perception. These studies advance 
attribution theory and the research examining cultural and demographic differences in 
attributional tendencies by exploring the implications of social attributions on down-
stream judgment and decision-making. In so doing, it is possible to gain some insight into 
how social perception affects decision-makers, such as jurors.  
These findings also advance legal theory by demonstrating a systematic way that 
individual psychology affects legal judgment and decision-making. If we can better 
understand systematic variability in human cognition, it might be possible to better 
predict and understand jury verdicts. These findings suggest that attributional tendencies 
have a significant influence on accident judgments in a negligent tort case. Although the 
effect sizes for this influence may seem small (with R-squared generally between .05 and 
.10), they are not insignificant especially in the context of other models where individual 
differences predict jurors’ assessments. In other studies, R-squared with multiple 
individual differences predicting jurors’ assessments tend to fall between .10 and .15 
(Saks, 1997).  
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Interestingly, my studies failed to replicate past research that demonstrates the 
link between attributional tendencies and the culturally influenced ethnic group 
differences, gender, socioeconomic status, and age. One possibility is that this occurred 
because the new Attributional Tendency Scale failed to detect these cultural differences. 
However, in Study 2 I was also able to include other measures of attributional tendencies 
(the Situationism Scale and Grossmann and Varnum’s Dispositionism and Situationism 
Measures) and even with those measures the only effects that emerged were with the 
Grossmann and Varnum Situationism Measure for gender and socioeconomic status. 
Importantly, there were no differences between Caucasian and Asian participants in 
Study 2 on any of the attributional tendency measures.  
It is possible that there were no differences because my Asian participants were 
students at an American university and consisted primarily of Asian Americans. These 
students may be highly acculturated to American culture. Consequently, they think and 
reason more like Westerners than traditional Asian cultures. This would align with the 
findings from Choi, Dalal, Kim-Prieto, and Park (2003). Their study on attributional 
tendencies found no differences between American and Asian American participants but 
did observe a significant difference between Korean participants and the other two 
groups. It is also possible that student samples are more culturally homogenous than 
others because of their shared student identity. If this is true, then non-student Asian 
Americans may show more cultural diversity than student Asian Americans. Future 
research could delve into this issue by using a non-student, community sample of 
Caucasian and Asian Americans. This sample would have the added benefit of being 
more representative of the jury pool. 
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Also contrary to my predictions, in Study 3 there was no effect of the 
dispositionism and situationism manipulations on accident judgments. However, there 
was an effect of the manipulations on Attributional Tendency Scale scores. The 
differences in Attributional Tendency Scale scores suggests that the dispositional and 
situational manipulations had some effect on the participant’s social perceptions. But, it 
would seem that this effect had no influence on accident perceptions and without 
additional research it is difficult to know why. It is possible that the manipulation was not 
powerful enough to overcome an individual’s ingrained attributional tendencies, but other 
manipulations might be. Or, it could be that the manipulation backfired in some way. As 
this was one of the first studies to attempt to manipulate attributional tendencies, future 
research is needed to explore the possibilities.  
These studies demonstrated a consistent and robust association between 
individual attributional tendencies and accident judgments. As the first set of studies 
seeking to develop a paradigm for future research in the area, there are a few key issues 
gleaned from this research that is worthy of further consideration. First is determining 
what it actually means when lay perceivers attribute causal influence to multiple factors. 
From a legal perspective, causation in negligent tort cases is understood in a scientific 
sense. Something either causes or does not cause the injury to occur, and it is possible for 
there to be multiple causes. For example, a causal question using our materials would ask 
whether the speed was a necessary condition for the accident to have occurred. However, 
lay assessments of causation are likely less scientific and less black-and-white. Instead, as 
our data suggests, people infer a social judgment and infuse it into their perceptions of 
causation. Lay perceptions of causation are likely imbued with inferences regarding fault.  
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The law draws a clear distinction between causation and determinations of 
responsibility, but it is uncertain whether our participants do the same. In future research, 
it would be useful to delve further into this issue and attempt to better understand how lay 
individuals distinguish—or fail to distinguish—between factual causation and 
perceptions of responsibility. In so doing, it is possible to better understand the 
mechanism through which attributional tendencies are affecting legal judgments. Further 
research could examine the influence of attributional tendencies on this issue using cases 
in which actual causation is ambiguous. This study could present participants with 
relevant scientific evidence on the issue of actual causation and ask them to provide 
evaluations of the evidence and causal determinations.  
Another issue worthy of further consideration is how the framing of the 
situational component of the accident scenario affects the influence of attributional 
tendencies. In our materials, we conceptualized Rick as the perceptual target and all other 
factors—including the actions of the bus driver—as components of the situation. 
Although this was not made explicit to our participants, it was implicit in the framing of 
the scenario and questions. The framing of the scenario could have easily focused instead 
on the bus driver as the perceptual target, making Rick’s actions a component of the 
situation. Making the actions of the bus driver the foreground and everything else—
including Rick’s driving—the background could dramatically alter perceptions of the 
scenario, and it is unknown how this might interact with attributional tendencies. 
From a legal perspective, if Rick had been injured in an accident because the bus 
was blocking the roadway, he likely could have sued for his damages. In cases where 
both parties contributed to the accident, sustained damages, and there has been the filing 
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of a claim and counterclaim, designation of “plaintiff” and “defendant” is somewhat 
arbitrary and based on who filed a lawsuit first. Although our accident scenario did not 
explicitly include this information, labeling one party as the plaintiff and the other as the 
defendant could change how the case in framed. Further, this framing could differentially 
impact perceptions and judgments for those who are dispositionally focused compared to 
those who are situationally focused.   
This is an exciting new area of research ripe for future studies that examine the 
boundaries of these findings, assess whether they generalize to other types of negligent 
tort cases, and further explore the many nuances. As this research continues to develop, 
and along with it our understanding of the legal implications, studies should also seek to 
bolster ecological validity by using materials that are more similar to those that would be 
presented in an actual trial. For example, participants could be asked to watch a video of 
a mock trial and then offer their judgments. Additionally, future studies could explore the 
implications of individual attributional tendencies on group deliberations and judgments. 
These studies were the first step in examining the influence of culturally derived 
attributional tendencies for juror decision-making in a negligent tort context. As this 
paradigm continues to develop, so will our understanding of the implications for law and 
legal policy.  
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Table 1.  
 
Variables of Interest 
Cultural Group Attributional 
Causal 
Determination Decision-making 
• Gender 
• Race & Ethnicity 
• Socioeconomic 
Status 
• Age 
 
• Situational 
• Dispositional 
• Strength of the 
perceived causal 
link between a 
defendant and the 
harm to the 
plaintiff. 
• Proportioning 
Causation 
• Perceived 
Responsibility 
• Liability Assessment 
• Damaged Award 
 
 
 
Table 2. 
 
Table of Hypotheses 
Cultural Group 
Attributional Tendencies of 
Cultural Groups (mediator) 
Effect on Downstream 
Decision-making 
• Gender 
• Race & Ethnicity 
• Socioeconomic 
Status 
• Age 
 
• Groups that are situational: 
o Women 
o East Asians 
o Lower Socioeconomic 
Status 
o Older People 
• Groups that are dispositional: 
o Men 
o Westerners 
o Higher Socioeconomic 
Status 
o Younger People 
. 
Dispositionally focused 
cultures will: 
• Proportion a greater 
percentage of causation to 
the defendant. 
• Proportion a greater 
percentage of 
responsibility to the 
defendant. 
• Be more likely to find the 
defendant liable. 
• Assess higher damage 
awards against the 
defendant. 
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Table 3.  
 
Study 1 Exploratory Factor Analysis factor loadings for the Attributional Tendency Scale 
 
  Subscale/Item 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Dispositionally Focused     
1) How people behave is mostly determined by their 
personality. 
.791 -.061 -.123 
2) An individual’s behavior is generally stable across 
time and situations. 
.302 .187 .713 
3) An individual’s personality predisposes them to act 
in specific ways. 
.841 .031 -.017 
4) An individual’s future behavior is predictable if you 
know his or her personality. 
.706 -.106 .217 
Situationally Focused    
5) Behavior can best be predicted by looking at 
situational factors. 
.191 -.757 .109 
6) Behavior is primarily determined by the situations 
people find themselves in. 
-.029 -.790 .153 
7) People in similar situations will behave similarly 
regardless of their personalities. 
-.201 -.224 .807 
8) Situational influences often have a large influence 
on someone’s behavior. 
-.012 -.857 -.183 
Note. Factor loadings > +/- .30 are in boldface. The exploratory factor analyses was done 
using Principal Axis Factoring with a Direct Oblimin rotation allowing the factors 
to correlate.  
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Table 4. 
 
Table of overall Means and Standard Deviations for all accident judgments across 
studies 
 
Variable Predicted 
Study 1 
M (SD) 
Study 2: 
Original 
M (SD) 
Study 2: 
ambiguous 
M (SD) 
Study 3 
M (SD) 
Perceived causation     
     Rick’s driving 47.70 (29.09) 46.35 (26.71) 30.97 (26.07) 38.98 (24.99) 
     Road & weather conditions 24.91 (18.67) 27.43 (20.11) 41.65 (24.46) 31.95 (19.24) 
     Bus location 21.89 (17.47) 19.86 (15.93) 20.29 (16.56) 23.99 (16.96) 
     Luck 4.01 (7.51) 4.22 (9.25) 4.21 (6.63) 3.93 (7.29) 
     Other 1.48 (5.58) 2.17 (5.62) 2.85 (7.16) 2.20 (5.87) 
     
Perceived fault     
     Rick’s driving — 55.00 (29.69) 38.06 (29.88) 50.38 (30.25) 
     Road & weather conditions — 19.50 (20.26) 36.38 (26.55) 23.00 (21.64) 
     Bus location — 21.06 (19.28) 20.41 (18.02) 22.85 (21.00) 
     Luck — 2.61 (8.19) 2.30 (5.58) 1.96 (4.85) 
     Other — 1.39 (4.39) 1.99 (5.29) 1.13 (3.88) 
     
Perceived responsibility     
     Rick’s driving 54.87 (31.46) 57.32 (30.79) 42.63 (32.73) 55.90 (31.36) 
     Road & weather conditions 19.66 (19.95) 15.57 (19.35) 31.74 (28.19) 18.62 (21.89) 
     Bus location 20.15 (19.81) 21.35 (21.19) 21.01 (20.59) 22.60 (21.52) 
     Luck 3.02 (7.08) 2.68 (8.84) 2.28 (6.85) 1.69 (5.19) 
     Other 1.85 (8.68) 1.10 (3.95) 2.00 (6.32) 1.04 (3.59) 
     
Perceived legal responsibility 5.18 (1.64) 5.34 (1.33) 4.75 (1.44) 5.26 (1.46) 
     
Perceived blameworthiness — 4.85 (1.42) 4.26 (1.52) 4.89 (1.42) 
     
Perceived inappropriateness — 5.14 (1.44) 3.90 (1.38) 4.91 (1.62) 
     
Damages owed by Rick 57133.25 
(36543.44) 
58512.16 
(31491.58) 
42470.33 
(32153.59) 
55,924.61 
(34,752.52) 
Note. “—” represents items for which there is no mean because they were not asked in 
Study 1. 
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Table 5. 
 
Study 1 Betas, R2, and F-values (overall model) for regression analyses with 
Dispositional Tendency Subscale (3-item; centered), Situational Tendency Subscale (3-
item; centered), and an interaction term predicting accident judgments 
 
Variable Predicted 
DTS 
β (p-value) 
STS 
β (p-value) 
DTSxSTS 
β (p-value) R2 F-values p-values 
Perceived causation       
     Rick’s driving .17 (.02) -.19 (.01) <-.01 (.99) .05 3.46 .02 
     Road & weather conditions -.10 (.16) .09 (.22) -.01 (.84) .02 1.02 .39 
     Bus location -.13 (.07) .09 (.23) .05 (.46) .02 1.58 .20 
     Luck -.05 (.48) .19 (.01) -.04 (.60) .04 2.42 .07 
     Other -.04 (.63) .11 (.12) -.03 (.71) .01 0.84 .47 
       
Perceived responsibility       
     Rick’s driving .15 (.04) -.20 (.01) -.06 (.39) .06 3.91 .01 
     Road & weather conditions -.13 (.07) .06 (.41) -.04 (.57) .02 1.30 .28 
     Bus location -.11 (.11) .10 (.17) .09 (.22) .03 1.84 .14 
     Luck -.11 (.13) .18 (.02) -.09 (.21) .04 2.79 .04 
     Other .04 (.61) .17 (.02) .12 (.09) .04 3.49 .02 
       
Perceived legal responsibility .16 (.03) -.10 (.18) -.14 (.05) .05 3.26 .02 
       
Damages owed by Rick .07 (.35) -.15 (.04) -.05 (.46) .03 1.88 .13 
       
 
 
 
Table 6. 
 
 Study 1 Mean Dispositional Tendency Subscale (DTS) score, Situational Tendency 
Subscale (STS), and Difference scores by Gender 
 
 DTS STS Difference 
Gender M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
     Men 5.02 (1.03) 4.72 (1.04) .30 (1.21) 
     Women 4.91 (.91) 4.83 (.98) .08 (1.26) 
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Table 7. 
 
Study 1 summary of correlations for scores on the Socioeconomic Status Composite, 
Subjective Social Class, Current Household Income, Childhood Household Income, 
Mother’s Education Level, and Father’s Education Level 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1. SES Composite —     
2. Subjective Social Class .71** —    
3. Current Household Income .67** .69** —   
4. Childhood Household Income .66** .31** .29** —  
5. Mother’s Education .65** .19** .13 .28** — 
6. Father’s Education .70** .21** .17* .37** .62** 
Note. ** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Table 8. 
 
Study 1 Means, degrees of freedom, F-values, and p-values for ANOVAs assessing the 
influence of Gender on accident judgments 
 
Variable Predicted 
Men 
M (SD) 
Women 
M (SD) 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
F-
values 
p-
values 
Perceived causation      
     Rick’s driving 47.38 (28.90) 49.03 (29.25) 198 .16 .69 
     Road & weather conditions 22.44 (17.92) 26.97 (19.50) 198 2.87 .09 
     Bus location 22.48 (19.13) 14.06 (1.34) 198 1.02 .31 
     Luck 5.26 (8.45) 3.04 (6.65) 198 4.32 .04 
     Other 2.44 (7.54) .77 (3.26) 198 4.40 .04 
      
Perceived responsibility      
     Rick’s driving 55.54 (30.40) 54.54 (32.37) 198 .05 .82 
     Road & weather conditions 16.57 (18.59) 22.24 (20.88) 198 4.03 .05 
     Bus location 19.91 (20.38) 20.08 (18.92) 198 < .01 .95 
     Luck 3.79 (7.57) 2.42 (6.69) 197 1.83 .18 
     Other 3.12 (12.35) .73 (3.25) 197 3.76 .05 
      
Perceived legal responsibility 5.26 (1.42) 5.12 (1.80) 197 .34 .56 
      
Damages owed by Rick 59561.11 
(35111.85) 
55146.81 
(37717.16) 198 .72 .40 
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Table 9. 
 
Study 1 Betas, R2, and F-values (overall model) for linear regression analyses with 
Socioeconomic Status Composite score predicting accident judgments 
 
Variable Predicted Betas R2 F-values p-values 
Perceived causation     
     Rick’s driving -.05 <.01 .58 .45 
     Road & weather conditions .09 .01 1.60 .21 
     Bus blocking road  -.01 <.01 .02 .90 
     Luck -.05 <.01 .41 .53 
     Other .07 <.01 .88 .35 
     
Perceived responsibility     
     Rick’s driving -.04 <.01 .31 .57 
     Road & weather conditions .03 <.01 .17 .68 
     Bus blocking road  .06 <.01 .75 .39 
     Luck -.04 <.01 .26 .61 
     Other -.03 <.01 .19 .66 
     
Perceived legal responsibility -.11 .01 2.19 .14 
     
Damages owed by Rick -.05 <.01 .57 .45 
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Table 10. 
 
Study 1 Betas, R2, and F-values (overall model) for linear regression analyses with age 
predicting accident judgments 
 
Variable Predicted Betas R2 F-values p-values 
Perceived causation     
     Rick’s driving .18 .03 6.26 .01 
     Road & weather conditions -.10 .01 1.86 .17 
     Bus blocking road  -.02 <.01 .09 .77 
     Luck -.20 .04 8.26 <.01 
     Other -.24 .06 11.79 <.01 
     
Perceived responsibility     
     Rick’s driving .15 .02 4.47 .04 
     Road & weather conditions -.04 <.01 .32 .57 
     Bus blocking road  -.07 <.01 .85 .36 
     Luck -.12 .01 2.78 .10 
     Other -.17 .03 6.14 .01 
     
Perceived legal responsibility .13 .02 3.33 .07 
     
Damages owed by Rick .06 <.01 .77 .38 
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Table 11.  
 
Study 2 factor loadings for the Attributional Tendency Scale for all the participants, the 
Caucasian participants, and the Asian participants 
 
 
All  
Participants 
Caucasian 
Participants 
Asian 
Participants 
  Subscale/Item F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 F1 F2 F3 
Dispositionally Focused           
1) How people behave is mostly 
determined by their personality. 
.713 -.106 -.053 -.027 .678 .120 .263 .654 -.016 
2) An individual’s behavior is 
generally stable across time and 
situations. 
.261 .154 .757 -.097 .295 .676 -.263 .422 .657 
3) An individual’s personality 
predisposes them to act in 
specific ways. 
.796 -.048 -.089 .087 .821 -.270 .004 .880 -.133 
4) An individual’s future behavior 
is predictable if you know his or 
her personality. 
.656 .042 .188 .016 .622 .161 .069 .469 .262 
Situationally Focused          
5) Behavior can best be predicted 
by looking at situational factors. 
.173 -.654 .025 .681 .081 .058 .571 .296 .051 
6) Behavior is primarily 
determined by the situations 
people find themselves in. 
-.034 -.844 .058 .841 .004 .068 .855 -.022 .021 
7) People in similar situations will 
behave similarly regardless of 
their personalities. 
-.182 -.188 .874 .148 -.147 .879 .225 -.213 .916 
8) Situational influences often 
have a large influence on 
someone’s behavior. 
-.014 -.783 -.034 .799 -.039 -.078 .826 .030 .024 
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Table 12. 
 
Study 2 summary of correlations for scores on the Dispositional Tendency Subscale, 
Situational Tendency Subscale, Situationism Scale, Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale, 
Grossmann & Varnum’s (G & V’s) Dispositionism Measure, and Grossmann & 
Varnum’s Situationism Measure 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Dispositional Tendency Subscale —      
2. Situational Tendency Subscale .30** —     
3. Situationism Scale .18** .30** —    
4. Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale  -.02  .07  .09 —   
5. G & V’s Dispositionism Measure .31** .16** .12** -.03 —  
6. G & V’s Situationism Measure .15** .28** .19** -.01 .19** — 
M  4.96  5.26  4.83 11.54  4.78  5.25 
SD  .86  .83  .59  3.43  .88  .82 
Note. ** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Table 13. 
 
Study 2 Betas, R2, and F-values (overall model) for regression analyses with 
Dispositional Tendency Subscale (DTS), Situational Tendency Subscale (“STS”), an 
Interaction Term (DTSxSTS), and Scenario predicting accident judgments 
 
Variable Predicted 
DTS 
b (p-value) 
STS 
b (p-value) 
DTSxSTS 
b (p-value) 
Scenario  
b (p-value) R2 F-values 
p-
values 
Perceived causation        
     Rick’s driving .12 (.01) -.08 (.09) .04 (.43) -.28 (<.01) .10 13.54 <.01 
     Road & weather conditions -.07 (.11) .11 (.01) -.06 (.18) .31 (<.01) .11 15.63 <.01 
     Bus location -.04 (.44) -.02 (.72) -.03 (.56) .01 (.81) < .01 .32 .87 
     Luck < -.01 (.98) -.06 (.23) .03 (.57) < -.01 (.98) <.01 .53 .72 
     Other -.02 (.69) -.08 (.09) .03 (.50) .05 (.25) .01 1.55 .19 
        
Perceived fault        
     Rick’s driving .09 (.05) -.05 (.27) .01 (.92) -.28 (<.01) .09 11.76 <.01 
     Road & weather conditions -.09 (.06) .11 (.01) -.02 (.62) .35 (<.01) .14 18.83 <.01 
     Bus location -.03 (.52) -.04 (.46) -.03 (.48) .05 (.66) <.01 .45 .78 
     Luck -.08 (.09) -.08 (.09) .02 (.65) -.03 (.50) .02 2.22 .07 
     Other -.02 (.73) -.07 (.17) .06 (.19) .07 (.11) .02 1.89 .11 
        
Perceived responsibility        
     Rick’s driving .12 (.01) -.09 (.06) .01 (.76) -.23 (<.01) .07 9.00 <.01 
     Road & weather conditions -.08 (.07) .09 (.06) -.03 (.56) .32 (<.01) .12 15.93 <.01 
     Bus location -.04 (.44) .06 (.25) -.03 (.49) -.01 (.87) <.01 .53 .72 
     Luck -.08 (.10) -.08 (.10) .03 (.49) -.03 (.47) .02  2.30 .06 
     Other -.07 (.15) -.04 (.37) .05 (.26) .09 (.06) .02 2.49 .04 
        
Perceived legal responsibility .07 (.12) -.01 (.76) -.02 (.68) -.21 (<.01) .05 6.54 <.01 
        
Perceived blameworthiness .19 (<.01) -.07 (.14) .04 (.40) -.19 (<.01) .07 9.41 <.01 
        
Perceived inappropriateness .05 (.23) -.02 (.72) .04 (.40) -.40 (<.01) .17 24.52 <.01 
        
Damages owed by Rick .09 (.06) -.06 (.17) -.06 (.20) -.24 (<.01) .07 9.38 <.01 
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Table 14. 
 
Study 2 Mean Dispositional Tendency Subscale (DTS) score, Situational Tendency 
Subscale (STS) scores, Difference scores (Diff), Situationism scores (Sit. Scale), 
Grossmann & Varnum’s (G & V’s) Dispositionism Measure, and Grossmann & 
Varnum’s Situationism Measure by ethnic group 
 
 DTS STS Diff Sit Scale G&V Dis G&V Sit 
Ethnic Group M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
     Asian 5.04 (.86) 5.26 (.86) -.23 (.89) 4.87 (.57) 4.83 (.89) 5.24 (.92) 
     Caucasian 4.93 (.82) 5.20 (.86) -.26 (1.10) 4.87 (.58) 4.77 (.89) 5.22 (.75) 
     Hispanic 4.93 (.94) 5.34 (.74) -.41 (.84) 4.76 (.62) 4.75 (.90) 5.35 (.81) 
 
 
Table 15. 
 
Study 1 Mean Dispositional Tendency Subscale (DTS) score, Situational Tendency 
Subscale (STS), Difference scores (Diff), Situationism scores (Sit. Scale), Grossmann & 
Varnum’s (G & V’s) Dispositionism Measure, and Grossmann & Varnum’s Situationism 
Measure by Gender 
 
 DTS STS Diff Sit Scale G&V Dis G&V Sit 
Gender M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
     Men 4.96 (.90) 5.22 (.88) -.26 (1.05) 4.85 (.60) 4.78 (.89) 5.16 (.87) 
     Women 4.96 (.83) 5.29 (.77) -.32 (.96) 4.82 (.57) 4.78 (.88) 5.33 (.77) 
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Table 16. 
 
Study 2 summary of correlations for scores on the Socioeconomic Status Composite, 
Subjective Social Class, Current Household Income, Mother’s Education Level, and 
Father’s Education Level 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 
1. SES Composite —    
2. Subjective Social Class .79** —   
3. Household Income .76** .74** —  
4. Mother’s Education .69** .28** .31** — 
5. Father’s Education .76** .40** .39** .53** 
Note. ** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Table 17. 
 
Study 2 Means, degrees of freedom, F-values, and p-values for ANOVAs assessing the 
influence of Ethnicity (Caucasian vs. Asian) on accident judgments 
 
Variable Predicted 
Caucasian 
M (SD) 
Asian 
M (SD) 
Degrees of 
Freedom F-values p-values 
Perceived causation      
     Rick’s driving 38.85 (27.83) 38.50 (26.77) 377 .01 .91 
     Road & weather conditions 33.32 (22.95) 34.79 (23.05) 377 .34 .56 
     Bus location 20.08 (15.72) 21.64 (18.34) 376 .74 .39 
     Luck 4.32 (8.15) 5.45 (9.76) 376 1.42 .24 
     Other 2.34 (5.77) 2.49 (5.04) 375 .06 .81 
      
Perceived fault      
     Rick’s driving 48.18 (30.86) 43.28 (30.49) 377 2.15 .14 
     Road & weather conditions 26.73 (25.55) 29.15 (24.36) 373 .77 .38 
     Bus location 21.00 (17.96) 22.01 (21.19) 377 .24 .63 
     Luck 1.95 (5.50) 4.31 (9.95) 374 8.76 <.01 
     Other 1.22 (3.99) 2.93 (6.00) 377 10.95 <.01 
      
Perceived responsibility      
     Rick’s driving 51.47 (32.39) 48.19 (31.64) 377 .88 .35 
     Road & weather conditions 23.67 (26.22) 23.46 (23.54) 376 .01 .94 
     Bus location 20.20 (19.27) 23.24 (22.31) 377 1.89 .17 
     Luck 2.34 (7.90) 3.83 (10.04) 375 2.49 .12 
     Other 1.32 (4.95) 1.91 (4.99) 377 1.20 .27 
      
Perceived legal responsibility 5.21 (1.33) 4.88 (1.42) 377 4.91 .03 
      
Perceived blameworthiness 4.71 (1.49) 4.43 (1.46) 373 3.02 .08 
      
Perceived inappropriateness 4.51 (1.59) 4.46 (1.37) 377 .10 .76 
      
Damages owed by Rick 54,193.45 
(34,187.75) 
45,270.33 
(28,668.91) 376 6.35 .01 
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Table 18. 
 
Study 2 Means, degrees of freedom, F-values, and p-values for ANOVAs assessing the 
influence of Gender on accident judgments 
 
Variable Predicted 
Men 
M (SD) 
Women 
M (SD) 
Degrees of 
Freedom F-values p-values 
Perceived causation      
     Rick’s driving 41.04 (28.00) 36.82 (26.90) 491 2.91 .09 
     Road & weather conditions 31.28 (22.98) 37.17 (23.52) 491 7.87 .01 
     Bus location 19.46 (16.45) 20.62 (16.04) 490 .63 .43 
     Luck 5.28 (9.76) 3.27 (6.05) 489 7.71 .01 
     Other 3.35 (7.31) 1.75 (5.43) 488 7.61 .01 
      
Perceived fault      
     Rick’s driving 48.43 (31.80) 45.15 (30.14) 491 1.39 .24 
     Road & weather conditions 24.94 (24.85) 30.27 (24.92) 487 5.58 .02 
     Bus location 21.09 (19.28) 20.43 (18.12) 491 .153 .70 
     Luck 3.73 (9.13) 1.33 (4.09) 487 14.66 <.01 
     Other 2.23 (5.86) 1.20 (3.71) 491 5.56 .02 
      
Perceived responsibility      
     Rick’s driving 52.54 (32.76) 47.96 (32.31) 491 2.44 .12 
     Road & weather conditions 20.79 (24.54) 25.89 (25.92) 490 4.99 .03 
     Bus location 20.70 (20.15) 21.61 (21.53) 491 .23 .63 
     Luck 3.60 (9.75) 1.50 (5.70) 489 8.67 <.01 
     Other 1.61 (4.84) 1.49 (5.62) 491 .06 .80 
      
Perceived legal responsibility 5.06 (1.47) 5.03 (1.36) 491 .06 .81 
      
Perceived blameworthiness 4.67 (1.47) 4.46 (1.52) 487 2.33 .13 
      
Perceived inappropriateness 4.61 (1.48) 4.47 (1.59) 491 1.02 .31 
      
Damages owed by Rick 51,460.83 
(31,887.27) 
49,940.42 
(33,601.03) 490 .26 .61 
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Table 19. 
 
Study 2 Betas, R2, and F-values (overall model) for linear regression analyses with the 
Socioeconomic Status Composite predicting accident judgments 
 
Variable Predicted Betas R2 F-values p-values 
Perceived causation     
     Rick’s driving .04 <.01 .57 .45 
     Road & weather conditions -.09 .01 3.47 .06 
     Bus blocking road  .03 <.01 .29 .59 
     Luck .05 <.01 1.34 .25 
     Other -.01 <.01 .05 .82 
     
Perceived fault     
     Rick’s driving .08 .01 2.81 .10 
     Road & weather conditions -.10 .01 5.10 .02 
     Bus blocking road  .06 <.01 1.64 .20 
     Luck .01 <.01 .08 .77 
     Other -.08 .01 3.26 .07 
     
Perceived responsibility     
     Rick’s driving .04 <.01 .76 .39 
     Road & weather conditions -.10 .01 5.05 .03 
     Bus blocking road  .03  <.01 .48 .49 
     Luck .06 <.01 1.85 .18 
     Other < -.01 <.01 .01 .93 
     
Perceived legal responsibility .07 .01 2.24 .14 
     
Perceived blameworthiness .08  .01 2.72 .10 
     
Perceived Inappropriateness  -.02 < .01 .15 .70 
     
Damages owed by Rick .05 <.01 1.22 .27 
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Table 20. 
 
Study 3 summary of correlations for scores on the Dispositional Tendency Subscale, 
Situational Tendency Subscale, Situationism Scale, Grossmann & Varnum’s (G & V’s) 
Dispositionism Measure, and Grossmann & Varnum’s Situationism Measure 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Dispositional Tendency Subscale —     
2. Situational Tendency Subscale -.14** —    
3. Situationism Scale .03 .21** —   
4. G & V’s Dispositionism Measure .31** -.06 .06 —  
5. G & V’s Situationism Measure .00 .34** .14* -.05  
M 4.87 5.25 4.77 4.66 5.21 
SD .89 .85 .66 .97 .78 
Note. ** p < .01; * p < .05 
 
 
Table 21. 
 
Study 3 Mean Dispositional Tendency Subscale (DTS) scores, and Situational Tendency 
Subscale (STS) score by Prime 
 
 DTS STS 
Prime M (SD) M (SD) 
     Dispositional 5.16 (.79) 5.02 (.90) 
     Situational 4.65 (.91) 5.42 (.77) 
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Table 22. 
 
Study 3 Means, degrees of freedom, F-values, and p-values for ANOVAs assessing the 
influence of Prime on accident judgments 
 
Variable Predicted 
Dispositional 
Prime 
M (SD) 
Situational 
Prime 
M (SD) 
Degrees of 
Freedom F-values p-values 
Perceived causation      
     Rick’s driving 38.98 (25.41) 38.99 (24.72) 1, 329 <.01  .99 
     Road & weather conditions 31.57 (18.24) 32.23 (20.02) 1, 329 .10 .76 
     Bus location 24.42 (17.34) 23.66 (16.71) 1, 329 .16 .69 
     Luck 4.93 (8.64) 3.16 (5.97) 1, 327 4.80 .03 
     Other 2.00 (4.68) 2.35 (6.65) 1, 325 .29 .59 
      
Perceived fault      
     Rick’s driving 49.58 (30.22) 50.99 (30.33) 1, 329 .18 .68 
     Road & weather conditions 22.49 (20.85) 23.40 (22.27) 1, 329 .14 .71 
     Bus location 25.13 (21.64) 21.10 (20.38) 1, 328 3.01 .08 
     Luck 1.88 (4.72) 2.02 (4.95) 1, 329 .06 .80 
     Other 1.40 (4.71) 0.92 (3.09) 1, 329 1.23 .27 
      
Perceived responsibility      
     Rick’s driving 53.75 (32.54) 57.56 (30.41) 1, 328 1.20 .28 
     Road & weather conditions 18.86 (21.75) 18.44 (22.07) 1, 327 .03 .86 
     Bus location 25.47 (24.33) 20.38 (18.84) 1, 328 4.59  .03 
     Luck 1.88 (6.14) 1.55 (4.33) 1, 329 .33 .57 
     Other 1.11 (3.47) 0.99 (3.68) 1, 329 .09 .76 
      
Perceived legal responsibility 5.17 (1.58) 5.33 (1.35) 1, 329 .98 .32 
      
Perceived blameworthiness 4.89 (1.44) 4.89 (1.41) 1, 327 <.01 .99 
      
Damages owed by Rick 55325.90 
(35601.79) 
56385.64 
(34173.13) 
1, 329 
 
.08 
 
.78 
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APPENDIX B  
STUDY 1 MATERIALS 
  
  121 
Part I 
 
Directions: Please read the following scenario carefully. You will be asked about 
specific details from the scenario later in the survey. 
 
 
It is early in the morning and Rick is speeding on a mostly empty two-lane road. The road 
is wet, and a dense fog has settled upon it. Up the road, a city bus has run out of gas and 
the bus driver has attempted to pull over to the shoulder. The bus, however, is still 
slightly blocking the roadway. Rick’s car hits the bus. 
 
 
1) To what extent do you believe each of the following factors caused the accident? 
Please provide the percentage (%) of responsibility for each factor, totaling to 100%. 
 
1. Rick’s driving     ____________% 
 
2. The road and weather conditions  ____________% 
 
3. The bus partially blocking the roadway ____________% 
 
4. Luck      ____________% 
 
5. Other      ____________% 
 
2) To what extent do you believe each of the following factors should be considered 
responsible for the accident? Please provide the percentage (%) of responsibility for each 
factor, totaling to 100%. 
 
1. Rick’s driving     ____________% 
 
2. The road and weather conditions  ____________% 
 
3. The bus partially blocking the roadway ____________% 
 
4. Luck      ____________% 
 
5. Other      ____________% 
 
 
3) Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Negligence may consist of action or 
inaction. Negligence is the failure to act as a reasonably careful person would act under 
the circumstances. 
 
Was Rick negligent?  _____Yes      _____No 
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4) To what extent do you agree with the following statement: Rick should be held legally 
responsible for hitting the bus. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
5) According to some state’s negligent tort laws, a person is only legal responsible for the 
amount of damages that their proportion of the harm caused. This means that they only 
have to pay for the proportion of the damages that they are responsible for causing. 
Assume this is the law and that the damages in this cases were $100,000. How much of 
the $100,000 in damages should Rick have to pay?  
 
Part II 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
 
(The order of these items will be mixed in the matrix) 
1. How people behave is mostly determined by their personality. 
2. An individual’s behavior is generally stable across time and situations. 
3. An individual’s personality predisposes them to act in specific ways. 
4. An individual’s future behavior is predictable if you know his or her personality. 
5. Situational influences often have a large influence on someone’s behavior. (R) 
6. People in similar situations will behave similarly regardless of their personalities. 
(R) 
7. Behavior is primarily determined by the situations people find themselves in. (R) 
8. Behavior can best be predicted by looking at situational factors. (R) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
Part III (Demographic Information) 
 
Age:  ______ 
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 Gender:   
 
 _____ Male 
 _____ Female 
 
Choose the one category that BEST describes your religion or tradition: 
 _____ Spiritual but not religious  
 _____ Atheist (non-believing) 
 _____ Agnostic (uncertain) 
 _____ Catholic or Greek Orthodox;  
 _____ Non-Catholic Christian;  
 _____ LDS/Mormon;  
 _____ Hindu;  
 _____ Buddhist;  
 _____ Jewish;  
 _____ Muslim;  
 _____ Native American;  
 _____ Other (Please specify):  ___________________________ 
 
Please rate how RELIGIOUS you are on a scale from 1-7” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Religious   Extremely Religious 
 
 
Please rate how SPIRITUAL you are on a scale from 1-7” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Spiritual    Extremely Spiritual 
 
How would you describe your ethnicity? 
 
 _____ White/Caucasian/European 
 _____ Black/African-American 
 _____ Hispanic/Latino/Chicano 
 _____ Asian-American 
 _____ Native American Indian 
 _____ Middle Eastern 
 _____ East Asian 
 _____ South/South East Asian 
 _____ Multiple Ethnicity 
 _____ Other (Please specify):  ___________________________ 
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What is your political affiliation? 
 
 _____ Democrat 
 _____Republican 
 _____ Libertarian 
 _____ Green 
 _____ Independent 
 _____ Other (please specify) __________________________ 
 
Using the sliding scale below, how conservative or liberal would you rate yourself on the 
following: 
Social Issues 
Economic Issues 
Overall 
 
(I will use a sliding scale in Qualtrics allowing participants to rate themselves on a 
continuum from very liberal to very conservative; -50 = “very liberal” and +50 = “very 
conservative”)  
   
What is the highest level of education attained by your mother and father? (check one for 
each) 
Mother          Father   
Less than high school      ______          ______ 
High school diploma      ______          ______ 
Some college or 2-year college degree (A.A.)  ______          ______ 
4-year college degree (B.A. or B.S.)     ______          ______ 
Graduate or professional degree (M.A., PhD, J.D., M.D.) ______          ______  
 
How would you describe your family’s current social-economic class, in terms of 
household income? (check one) 
____  Upper class     
____  Upper-middle class    
____  Middle class 
____  Lower middle class  
____  Working class 
 
What was your family’s yearly household income when you last lived with your 
parents/guardians? (If you still live with your family, please refer to income in the past 
year.) 
____  less than $10,000   ____ $50,000 to $74,999 
____  $10,000 to $19,999   ____ $75,000 to $99,999 
____  $20,000 to $29,999   ____ $100,000 to $200,000    
____  $30,000 to $49,999   ____ More than $200,000 
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Were you born in the U.S?  
_____Yes 
_____No 
 
Are you a U.S. citizen? 
_____Yes 
_____No 
 
Is English your native language? 
_____Yes 
_____No 
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APPENDIX C  
STUDY 2 MATERIALS 
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Part I 
 
Directions: Please read the following scenario carefully. You will be asked about 
specific details from the scenario later in the survey. 
 
Version 1 – (Study 1 version) 
It is early in the morning and Rick is speeding on a mostly empty two-lane road. The road 
is wet, and a dense fog has settled upon it. Up the road, a city bus has run out of gas and 
the bus driver has attempted to pull over to the shoulder. The bus, however, is still 
slightly blocking the roadway. Rick’s car hits the bus. 
 
 
Version 2– (“speeding” is removed so that it is not negligence per se; the bus is no longer 
blocking the roadway removing any contributory negligence) 
It is early in the morning and Rick is driving on a mostly empty two-lane road. The road 
is wet, and a dense fog has settled upon it. Up the road, a city bus has run out of gas and 
the bus driver has pull over to the shoulder. Rick’s car hits the bus. 
 
 
1) To what extent do you believe each of the following factors caused the accident? 
Please provide the percentage (%) of cause attributable to each factor, totaling to 100%. 
 
1. Rick’s driving     ____________% 
 
2. The road and weather conditions  ____________% 
 
3. The location of the bus   ____________% 
 
4. Luck      ____________% 
 
5. Other      ____________% 
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2) To what extent do you believe each of the following factors should be considered at 
fault for the accident? Please provide the percentage (%) of fault for each factor, totaling 
to 100%. 
 
1. Rick’s driving     ____________% 
 
2. The road and weather conditions  ____________% 
 
3. The location of the bus   ____________% 
 
4. Luck      ____________% 
 
5. Other      ____________% 
 
 
3) To what extent do you believe each of the following factors should be considered 
responsible for the accident? Please provide the percentage (%) of responsibility for each 
factor, totaling to 100%. 
 
1. Rick’s driving     ____________% 
 
2. The road and weather conditions  ____________% 
 
3. The location of the bus   ____________% 
 
4. Luck      ____________% 
 
5. Other      ____________% 
 
 
4) Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Negligence may consist of action or 
inaction. Negligence is the failure to act as a reasonably careful person would act under 
the circumstances. 
 
Was Rick negligent?  _____Yes      _____No 
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5) To what extent do you agree with the following statements:  
 
a) Rick should be held legally responsible for hitting the bus. 
b) Rick is to blame for the accident. 
c) Rick’s actions were inappropriate given the circumstances. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
6) According to some state’s negligent tort laws, a person is only legal responsible for the 
amount of damages that their proportion of the harm caused. This means that they only 
have to pay for the proportion of the damages that they are responsible for causing. 
Assume this is the law and that the damages in this cases were about $100,000. How 
much of the $100,000 in damages should Rick have to pay?  
 
Part II 
 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements: 
 
(The order of these items will be mixed in the matrix) 
9. How people behave is mostly determined by their personality. 
10. An individual’s behavior is generally stable across time and situations. 
11. An individual’s personality predisposes them to act in specific ways. 
12. An individual’s future behavior is predictable if you know his or her personality. 
13. Situational influences often have a large influence on someone’s behavior. (R) 
14. People in similar situations will behave similarly regardless of their personalities. 
(R) 
15. Behavior is primarily determined by the situations people find themselves in. (R) 
16. Behavior can best be predicted by looking at situational factors. (R) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
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The Situationism Scale (Roberts et al., 2015): 
 
1. I pay attention to relationships between my environment and my behavior. 
2. When my self-control fails, it is partly due to my current surroundings. 
3. I tend to be conscious of my surroundings. 
4. Certain locations can make self-control difficult for me. 
5. I never really notice how places affect me. (R) 
6. My surrounding environment has no influence on my behavior. (R) 
7. Some circumstances make it difficult for me to resist conforming. 
8. My good intentions can be defeated when a temptation is in front of me. 
9. The places around me influence my behavior. 
10. I take notice of how people influence me. 
11. How disciplined I behave has nothing to do with the temptations that are around 
me. (R) 
12. Certain people can make self-control difficult for me. 
13. Regardless of my personality, how I act is affected by the people around me. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
 Rotter's Locus of Control Scale: 
 
This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which certain important events in our 
society affect different people. Each item consists of a pair of alternatives lettered a or b. 
Please select the one statement of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly 
believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Be sure to select the one you actually 
believe to be more true rather than the one you think you should choose or the one you 
would like to be true. This is a measure of personal belief: obviously there are no right or 
wrong answers. 
 
Please answer these items carefully but do not spend too much time on any one item. Be 
sure to find an answer for every choice. In some instances you may discover that you 
believe both statements or neither one. In such cases, be sure to select the one you more 
strongly believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Also try to respond to each 
item independently when making your choice; do not be influenced by your previous 
choices. 
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1. a. Children get into trouble because their 
patents punish them too much.  
b. The trouble with most children nowadays 
is that their parents are too easy with them.  
2. a. Many of the unhappy things in 
people's lives are partly due to bad luck.  
b. People's misfortunes result from the 
mistakes they make.  
3. a. One of the major reasons why we 
have wars is because people don't take 
enough interest in politics.  
b. There will always be wars, no matter how 
hard people try to prevent them.  
4. a. In the long run people get the respect 
they deserve in this world  
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often 
passes unrecognized no matter how hard he 
tries  
5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to 
students is nonsense.  
b. Most students don't realize the extent to 
which their grades are influenced by 
accidental happenings.  
6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot 
be an effective leader.  
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders 
have not taken advantage of their 
opportunities.  
7. a. No matter how hard you try some 
people just don't like you.  
b. People who can't get others to like them 
don't understand how to get along with 
others.  
8. a. Heredity plays the major role in 
determining one's personality  
b. It is one's experiences in life which 
determine what they're like.  
9. a. I have often found that what is going 
to happen will happen.  
b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as 
well for me as making a decision to take a 
definite course of action.  
10. a. In the case of the well prepared 
student there is rarely if ever such a thing 
as an unfair test.  
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so 
unrelated to course work that studying in 
really useless.  
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of 
hard work, luck has little or nothing to do 
with it.  
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on 
being in the right place at the right time.  
12. a. The average citizen can have an 
influence in government decisions.  
b. This world is run by the few people in 
power, and there is not much the little guy 
can do about it.  
13. a. When I make plans, I am almost 
certain that I can make them work.  
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead 
because many things turn out to be a matter 
of good or bad fortune anyhow.  
14. a. There are certain people who are just 
no good.  
b. There is some good in everybody.  
15. a. In my case getting what I want has 
little or nothing to do with luck.  
b. Many times we might just as well decide 
what to do by flipping a coin.  
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often 
depends on who was lucky enough to be in 
the right place first.  
b. Getting people to do the right thing 
depends upon ability. Luck has little or 
nothing to do with it.  
17. a. As far as world affairs are 
concerned, most of us are the victims of 
forces we can neither understand, nor 
control.  
b. By taking an active part in political and 
social affairs the people can control world 
events.  
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18. a. Most people don't realize the extent 
to which their lives are controlled by 
accidental happenings.  
b. There really is no such thing as "luck."  
19. a. One should always be willing to 
admit mistakes.  
b. It is usually best to cover up one's 
mistakes.  
20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a 
person really likes you.  
b. How many friends you have depends upon 
how nice a person you are.  
21. a. In the long run the bad things that 
happen to us are balanced by the good 
ones.  
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of 
ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.  
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out 
political corruption.  
b. It is difficult for people to have much 
control over the things politicians do in 
office.  
23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how 
teachers arrive at the grades they give.  
b. There is a direct connection between how 
hard I study and the grades I get.  
24. a. A good leader expects people to 
decide for themselves what they should do.  
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody 
what their jobs are.  
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little 
influence over the things that happen to 
me.  
b. It is impossible for me to believe that 
chance or luck plays an important role in my 
life.  
26. a. People are lonely because they don't 
try to be friendly.  
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to 
please people, if they like you, they like you.  
27. a. There is too much emphasis on 
athletics in high school.  
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build 
character.  
28. a. What happens to me is my own 
doing.  
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough 
control over the direction my life is taking.  
29. a. Most of the time I can't understand 
why politicians behave the way they do.  
b. In the long run the people are responsible 
for bad government on a national as well as 
on a local level.  
 
 
Grossman & Varnum measures of attributional tendencies: 
 
In the following questionnaire we would like to find out more about the effects of social 
perceptions of different people. You will be presented with several situations. Each of 
them will describe a person involved in a certain activity. You will be asked to think 
about different reasons for this person’s behavior, as well as to evaluate this person’s 
behavior.  
 
Please, carefully read and answer the following questions.  
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Situation One  
 
Sara Martin is a top executive of a company “XinK Int.” “XinK Int.” is one of the 
leading pharmaceutical companies in the US. However, the company has experienced a 
decline in their public image which has lead to a decline in sales in the last half a year. 
Recently, the company started several activities, which were focused on the stabilization 
of their leading position in the pharmaceutical market.  
 
Not too long ago, “XinK Int.” developed a new drug for treating malaria. Shortly after 
that several African countries experienced an outbreak of malaria. As soon as Sara 
Martin found out about this event, she decided to donate a lot of medicine to the regions 
in Africa that needed assistance. Local mass media showed different reactions to this 
news. 
 
Please, carefully read the following statements and indicate your level of agreement with 
each of them.  
 
1. Sara Martin’s personality primarily influenced her behavior.  
2. Particular circumstances primarily influenced Sara Martin’s behavior. 
3. Sara Martin would have acted differently if her personality had been different. 
4. Sara Martin would have acted differently if the particular circumstances had been 
different. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Situation Two  
 
Since his childhood, David Conner wanted to become a doctor. Now, he is a young surgeon 
at a local hospital in the Baltimore area. During his first year he has had a wonderful track 
record. However, due to a recent argument with the head physician, any little mistake would 
mean that he would be fired.  
 
Last week, a patient died during his surgery because another doctor had given her an 
incorrect diagnosis. However, David decided to hide this fact and told the woman’s family 
that the weak heart of the patient was the reason for her death and the doctors could not save 
her. 
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Please, carefully read the following statements and indicate your level of agreement with 
each of them.  
 
1. David Conner’s personality primarily influenced his behavior.  
2. Particular circumstances primarily influenced David Conner’s behavior. 
3. David Conner would have acted differently if his personality had been different. 
4. David Conner would have acted differently if the particular circumstances had been 
different. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
Situation Three  
 
Emma Peterson is a banker at a large bank in Cincinnati, IN. Several major pension funds 
are heavily invested in the bank. In the last couple of months, the bank lost a large amount of 
money on the stock market. The current financial difficulties of the bank may devalue the 
bank’s shares.  
 
However, Emma Peterson did not reveal the loss to the company’s shareholders in order to 
avoid causing panic. Instead, Emma Peterson reported a sizeable profit at the annual 
meeting of the shareholders, hoping that the annual balance of the company would still be 
positive in comparison to the last year. 
 
Please, carefully read the following statements and indicate your level of agreement with 
each of them.  
 
1. Emma Peterson’s personality primarily influenced her behavior.  
2. Particular circumstances primarily influenced Emma Peterson’s behavior. 
3. Emma Peterson would have acted differently if her personality had been different. 
4. Emma Peterson would have acted differently if the particular circumstances had been 
different. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
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Steve Jensen is the president of a large construction company in New York. Last year, 
local government fined the company, as unstable scaffolding caused problems resulting 
in injuries to several people. Recently, Steve Jensen started a special discount house 
building program for large families. Also, he decided to donate a large sum of money to a 
local orphanage. 
 
Please, carefully read the following statements and indicate your level of agreement with 
each of them.  
 
1. Steve Jensen’s personality primarily influenced his behavior.  
2. Particular circumstances primarily influenced Steve Jensen’s behavior. 
3. Steve Jensen would have acted differently if his personality had been different. 
4. Steve Jensen would have acted differently if the particular circumstances had been 
different. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
Part III (Demographic Information) 
 
Age:  ______ 
 
 Gender:   
 
 _____ Male 
 _____ Female 
 
Choose the one category that BEST describes your religion or tradition: 
 _____ Spiritual but not religious  
 _____ Atheist (non-believing) 
 _____ Agnostic (uncertain) 
 _____ Catholic or Greek Orthodox;  
 _____ Non-Catholic Christian;  
 _____ LDS/Mormon;  
 _____ Hindu;  
 _____ Buddhist;  
 _____ Jewish;  
 _____ Muslim;  
 _____ Native American;  
 _____ Other (Please specify):  ___________________________ 
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Please rate how RELIGIOUS you are on a scale from 1-7” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Religious   Extremely Religious 
 
Please rate how SPIRITUAL you are on a scale from 1-7” 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Spiritual    Extremely Spiritual 
 
 
How would you describe your ethnicity? 
 
 _____ White/Caucasian/European 
 _____ Black/African-American 
 _____ Hispanic/Latino/Chicano 
 _____ Asian-American 
 _____ Native American 
 _____ East Asian (e.g., China, Japan, Korea) 
 _____ Southeast Asian (e.g., Indonesia, Vietnam) 
 _____ South Asian (e.g., India) 
 _____ Asian American 
 _____ Middle Eastern/Arab/Arab American 
 _____ European or Australian 
 _____ African 
 _____ Other (Please specify):  ___________________________ 
 
What is your political affiliation? 
 
 _____ Democrat 
 _____Republican 
 _____ Libertarian 
 _____ Green 
 _____ Independent 
 _____ Other (please specify) __________________________ 
 
Using the sliding scale below, how conservative or liberal would you rate yourself on the 
following: 
Social Issues 
Economic Issues 
Overall 
 
(I used a sliding scale in Qualtrics allowing participants to rate themselves on a 
continuum from very liberal to very conservative; -50 = “very liberal” and +50 = “very 
conservative”)   
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What is the highest level of education attained by your mother and father? (check one for 
each) 
Mother          Father   
Less than high school      ______          ______ 
High school diploma      ______          ______ 
Some college or 2-year college degree (A.A.)  ______          ______ 
4-year college degree (B.A. or B.S.)     ______          ______ 
Master of Arts or Science (M.A., M.S.)   ______          ______  
PhD, MD, JD       ______          ______  
 
How would you describe your family’s current social-economic class, in terms of 
household income? (check one) 
____  Upper class     
____  Upper-middle class    
____  Middle class 
____  Lower middle class  
____  Lower class 
 
What was your family’s yearly household income when you last lived with your 
parents/guardians? (If you still live with your family, please refer to income in the past 
year.) 
____  less than $25,000   ____ $125,000 to $149,999 
____  $25,000 to $49,999   ____ $150,000 to $174,999 
____  $50,000 to $74,999   ____ $175,000 to $199,999    
____  $75,000 to $99,999   ____ $200,000 to $ 224,999 
____  $100,000 to $124,999   ____ More than $225,000 
 
In which country were you born? 
 
Are you a U.S. citizen? 
_____Yes 
_____No 
 
Is English your native language? 
_____Yes 
_____No 
 
Are you a student that came to the United States for college but are originally from 
another country? 
_____Yes 
_____No 
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(If yes) How many semesters have you been in the United States? 
(free response) 
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STUDY 3 PRIMES 
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Instructions: This first study examines short term memory for narrative information. 
Please take a few minutes to carefully read a section of a recent Op-Ed article from the 
New York Times. You will later be asked to recall details of the article during a memory 
task. 
 
Situationism Prime:  
 
The Science Behind the Power of Situations 
 
Recent psychological research from Cornell University has actually found that situational 
influences, including pressures at work, what our friends are doing, social status, and 
even whether we are running late for an important meeting, account for much more of 
human behavior than previously thought. 
 
Dr. Jonathan Simmons, the lead investigator on the project from Cornell University, told 
reporters, “Our findings illustrate the powerful influences of the situations in which 
people find themselves. Situational power is so strong that our research actually finds that 
it has more influence on behavior than one’s personality. Interestingly, our research also 
shows people in a particular situation behave very similarly, despite large individual 
differences in personality.”  
 
Dr. Simmons goes on to discuss the implications of the strong influence of the situation 
for being able to predict people’s future behavior. “Therefore, in order to predict and 
explain one’s behavior, we have to focus on the situation rather than personality. At 
times, personality plays a weaker role in behavior than we used to think.” 
 
Although people might believe that someone’s personality dictates his or her behavior, 
there seems to be increasing evidence that the circumstances and situations people find 
themselves in have the strongest impact on their behavior. 
 
Dispositionism Prime: 
 
The Science Behind the Power of Personality 
 
Recent psychological research from Cornell University has actually found that 
personality characteristics, including extroversion, temperament, intelligence, and even 
friendliness, account for much more of human behavior than previously thought. 
 
Dr. Jonathan Simmons, the lead investigator on the project from Cornell University, told 
reporters, “Our findings illustrates that the power of someone’s personality is so strong 
that our research actually finds that it has more influence on behavior than the situations 
in which people find themselves. Interestingly, our research also shows people with 
similar personality charactistics behave very similarly, despite large differences in their 
environments and social situations.”  
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Dr. Simmons goes on to discuss the implications of the strong influence of personality 
characteristics for being able to predict people’s future behavior. “Therefore, in order to 
predict and explain one’s behavior, we have to focus on specific personality 
characteristics rather than individual circumstances. At times, personality plays an even 
stronger role in behavior than we used to think.” 
 
Although people might believe that someone’s circumstance dictates his or her behavior, 
there seems to be increasing evidence supporting the notion that it is really someone’s 
personality that has the strongest impact on their behavior. 
 
(Note: The rest of the materials for Study 3 are the same as Study 2, except that only 
Scenario 1 (the original scenario) was used.) 
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